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Cash, Credit, or Cell Phone? How to Influence Public Preferences About 
Payment Systems examines how the government can influence the public’s choice of a 
particular payment system: not only existing systems like credit and debit cards, but 
innovative products such as stored value cards, electronic checks and electronic money.  
The success or failure of a new payment system can have a large economic impact, with 
shifts toward electronic payment options in particular having the potential to save up to 
one percent of a nation’s gross domestic product.  For the United States, that translates to 
approximately one hundred billion dollars worth of savings. 
 
Whether a new payment system succeeds or fails depends upon social acceptance; 
that is, consumers and merchants have to simultaneously embrace the new payment 
option.  Government action, both direct and indirect, can strongly influence consumer 
and merchant behavior.  Whether and how the government affects payment preferences 
depends on whether the government is acting as fiduciary, seller, or law-maker; its 
precise goal; and the particular sort of payment system at issue.  Depending on the 
situation, the government may (1) provide information that allows individuals to 
coordinate behavior, (2) pass legislation or adopt policies aimed at reducing concerns 
about a particular system, (3) provide incentives to induce individuals to adopt new 
payment systems, or (4) force change by eliminating or curtailing the older payment 
form.  Cash, Credit or Cell Phone? suggests that in the realm of payments, governmental 
efforts to influence behavior will be most successful if they force change, not if they 
gently influence  public preferences.  This conclusion runs counter to the common 
wisdom in the social norms literature that law most effectively influences behavior when 
it promotes incremental advancement, not wholesale change. 
 
Because payment methods are poised to continue the massive evolution that has 
occurred over the past twenty-five years, advocates of new systems are increasingly 
likely to attempt to involve government in promoting their fledging payment 
mechanisms.  Cash, Credit or Cell Phone? suggests that government intervention, 
although often successful, is usually unwise for at least three reasons.  First, technology 
moves quickly and the government usually moves slowly.  Second, with a bit of time, 
new payment systems that are sufficiently advantageous to the public are likely to 
flourish without governmental intervention.  Third and finally, governmental intervention 
may have the unintended consequence of undermining the incentive to invest in new 
payment technologies in the first instance.  
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Introduction 
 
Open your wallets.  Many of you have a couple of credits cards, an ATM or debit 
card and, if you live in a metropolitan area with a large transit system, a stored value card 
that you use to pay the transit fare.  You probably have some cash as well, maybe a few 
singles, a couple of fives, and a twenty.  What you almost certainly do not have is a two-
dollar bill, even though Congress made the bill legal tender as far back as 1862.2
While most of us are familiar only with the two-dollar bill issued in 1976, the 
denomination actually has a long history in this country, one that is best summarized as a 
“flop.”  The bill has been extraordinarily unpopular since its beginning.  In 1862, the bill 
featured a portrait of Alexander Hamilton, the Treasury Secretary who was killed in a 
duel by Aaron Burr.  Remarkably, the story that the bill was “bad luck” quickly took 
hold.  In 1869, the Treasury replaced Hamilton’s picture with one of Jefferson, but most 
Americans still refused to use the bill, or, if they did, they tore the corner off in a practice 
that was said to break the “curse.”3 In 1966, the Treasury cited “a lack of public interest” 
and formally discontinued the bill.4 At that time, two-dollar bills accounted for less than 
one-third of one percent of all circulating currency.  Two-dollar bills were used so 
 
1 Order of attribution is random.  Both of us are professors of law at Seton Hall University.   We would like 
to thank, in no particular order, Jake Barnes, Stephen Lubben and Charlie Sullivan for reading and (at least 
in the case of the first two) providing helpful comments on prior drafts of this article.  We would also like 
to acknowledge the hard work of our research assistants, Sydney Peck, Randall Samson, and Alison Weyer.   
In addition, we are indebted to participants in a panel at the 2005 Law and Society Association Annual 
Meeting, as well as attendees at the Annual Meeting of the 2006 Canadian Law and Economics 
Association.  Finally, we would be negligent if we failed to acknowledge the Dean’s Summer Grant Fund 
for its generous support. 
2 Act of February 25, 1862.  In 1776, the Continental Congress authorized issuances of $2 denominations in 
“bills of credit for the defense of America.”  Suzanne J. Stone, ECONOMIC REVIEW, March/April 1976, at p. 
20 (citing U.S. Department of the Treasury, HISTORICAL NARRATIVE ON THE $2 BILL (Washington, D.C. 
Nov. 3, 1975)). 
3 Timothy Schellhardt, Finally, Government Mulls Action to Make the Greenback Go Farther, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL, 1973. 
4 Two Dollar Bill Scratched Due to ‘Limited Interest,’ WALL STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 11, 1966, at 5. 
2infrequently that their average life was six years, compared to 18 months for a one dollar 
bill.5
In 1976, ten years after the government discontinued the bill, efficiency concerns 
prompted the Treasury to bring it back.  The Treasury argued that, by replacing about 
half of the one-dollar bills with the equivalent dollar amount of two-dollar bills, it would 
save between four and seven million dollars each year (in 1976 dollars).6 The Treasury 
further suggested that individuals would experience efficiency gains as well.  Rising 
inflation meant that one-dollar bills purchased less and less, and a two-dollar bill was 
expected to facilitate cash transactions and decrease business operating costs by reducing 
the number of bills that retailers and banks handled.7 Although the bill was issued in 
1976 and featured the signing of the Declaration of Independence, the Treasury stressed 
that the reissue “was not intended as simply a commemorative act for this year, but rather 
signifies the permanent addition of another U.S. denomination.”  The Treasury further 
emphasized that it was printing a large number of the bills, so that enough would be 
available for widespread use.8
The new two-dollar bill was so poorly received, however, that by 1982, Federal 
Reserve banks still had about half of the original bills in their vaults, awaiting circulation. 
Nothing captures the failure of the bill more aptly than the Treasury website itself.  The 
website lists “Why is the $2 bill no longer in circulation?” as one of the most frequently 
asked questions.  The Treasury responds by noting that, contrary to popular belief, the 
bill still circulates, but: 
The key for successfully circulating the two-dollar bill is for retailers to use 
them just like any other denomination in their daily operations.  In addition, 
most commercial banks will readily supply their retail customers with these 
bills if their customers request them in sufficient volume to justify stocking 
them in their vaults.  However, neither the Treasury Department nor the 
Federal Reserve System can force the distribution or use of any 
denomination of currency on banks, businesses, or individuals.9
The success of the two-dollar bill depends, in other words, on whether individuals choose 
 
5 Stone, supra note 2, at 21. 
6 Schellhardt, supra note 3. 
7 Schellhardt, supra note 3. 
8 Treasury Will Resurrect the $2 Bill Next April, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Nov. 4, 1975, at 23. 
9 http://www.treas.gov/education/faq/currency/denominations.shtml (last visited Sept. 4, 2006). 
3to use the bill in the first instance. Over the past thirty years, they have refused to. 
In retrospect, the Treasury’s concern with the loss of purchasing power for the 
one-dollar bill and the efficiency gain from switching to the two-dollar bill seem quaint.  
The past thirty years have seen a major shift in the ways consumers pay for their 
purchases, both large and small, and these changes have vastly decreased the need for a 
switch to the two-dollar bill.  Through the 1970s, checks and cash dominated the world of 
payments.  Since that time, though, financial institutions have introduced numerous 
alternative payment schemes, such as credit cards, debit cards, electronic money, 
electronic checks, and automated clearing house transactions, all of which have lessened 
the need for cash and checks.   
In coming years, we are likely to see increased marketing of new electronic 
payment products.  Since the 1990s, banks and other payment service providers have 
been trotting out (with varying success) new payment products such as stored value 
cards, payroll cards, electronic checks, electronic money, and the electronic truncation of 
checks.  During the remainder of this decade, we are likely to see the use of even more 
sophisticated payment systems that function through cell phones or through small 
electronic transmitters found on our keychains.  Many of these products are already in 
widespread use in foreign countries.  Indeed, some payments providers have already 
begun to discuss the possibility of payment using biometric devices that would identify 
payers through their fingerprints or other physical characteristics.  The open question is 
whether, like credit cards and debit cards, these new payment methods will go into 
widespread use in the United States or whether they will suffer the fate of the two-dollar 
bill.  
The success or failure of each of these payment systems has a potentially large 
economic impact.  One recent study concluded that the move to electronic payment 
systems can save up to 1% of a country’s GDP.10 Success or failure, though, depends not 
just on economics but upon social acceptance.  For instance, the recent growth in the 
usage of debit cards has been directly linked to consumers= willingness to not merely use 
debit cards to withdraw cash from bank accounts but to make actual purchases with the 
 
10 David Humphrey et al., Benefits from a changing payment technology in European banking, __ J. 
BANKING & FIN. ___ (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 2) (suggesting possible savings of up to 1% of 
national GDP, and documenting averge savings of 0.38% of national GDP). 
4cards, something unheard of just ten years ago.11 Similarly, the relatively spectacular 
failure of electronic money “stored value cards” in an experiment on the Upper West Side 
of Manhattan in the late 1990s is a striking reminder that any payment system, no matter 
how technologically savvy, will fail without customer support.12 Even money itself is 
defined in social terms, as “any generally acceptable means of payment in exchange for 
goods and services and in settling debts.”13 
This article is about how the government and financial institutions can influence 
the public’s choice of a particular payment system.  Governmental action, both indirect 
and direct, affects what is “generally acceptable,” that is, what forms of payment 
merchants will accept and consumers will use.  As an example of indirect intervention, 
extensive legislation and regulation supports the checking system; Articles 3 and 4 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, along with an array of federal laws and regulations, set the 
basic terms for most check transactions, while the Federal Reserve itself has long acted as 
a cornerstone in the process of check collection. In an indirect fashion, these kinds of 
government actions make a particular payment system more attractive.  After all, if 
checks were more difficult to exchange, people would be less inclined to use them.  
Government support for the implementation of, or the infrastructure for, a particular 
payment system generally shifts consumer choices toward that system. 
The government also “speaks” explicitly to the public in an effort to influence its 
preference for a particular payment system.  For instance, through section 5103 of Title 
31, the federal government speaks to the public about what we think of as “money”—
pennies, nickels, dimes, quarters, and various denominations of federal reserve notes.   
The title provides that AUnited States coins and currency ... are legal tender for all debts, 
public charges, taxes, and dues.@14 As a result, all private and public creditors are 
 
11 See infra text accompanying note XX. 
12See Saul Hansell, Got a Dime? Citibank and Chase End Test of Electronic Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 
1998, at C1 (reporting that under $2 million was spent by consumers during the first year of the program); 
David M. Halbfinger, West Siders Testing A Substitute for Pocket Change, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1997, at B1. 
13 FISHER, DORNBUSHCH & SCHMALENSEE, ECONOMICS 476 (2d ed. 1988) 
14 31 U.S.C. § 5103.  The constitutionality of the predecessor to § 5103 was addressed by the Supreme 
Court in a series of cases known, fittingly, as The Legal Tender Cases. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Legal 
Tender Cases, 1981 S. Ct. Rev. 367.  As Professor Dam and others have noted, there is a substantial case to 
be made that the Framers intended that the Congress would not have the power to declare anything legal 
tender.  See id. at 368; Farley Grubb, The United States Constitution and Monetary Powers: An Analysis of 
5required to accept federal currency in payment of debts, subject to a limitation of 
reasonableness for the time and means of payment.15 As another example, a state transit 
authority may give preferential treatment to customers who use electronic payment, such 
as Metrocard or E-Z Pass.16 Or, as a third example, Congress may pass statutes that 
alleviate consumer concerns about the risk of credit card fraud.  In all of these instances, 
government attempts to influence preferences about particular forms of payment. 
When it comes to emerging payment systems, the federal government has already 
begun to attempt to shape consumer choices.  Just two years ago, Congress passed Check 
21, which aimed to modernize our checking system by eliminating the journey that 
checks make by ground and air after they are written by the payor.17 Check 21 
streamlines check processing by requiring all banks and consumers to accept electronic 
substitutes for the original check.  It seeks to alter consumer preferences in two different 
ways.  First, as with the legal tender statute, Check 21 overrides consumer preferences: 
even if a bank or consumer would prefer to receive the original check, they cannot insist 
upon it.18 Second, Check 21 requires that electronic substitute checks contain the legend, 
“This a legal copy of your check.  You can use it the same way you would use the 
original check.”19 By educating the public that substitute checks have exactly the same 
legal force as the original checks they replace, the legend speaks directly to consumers.   
Check 21 is likely only the tip of the legislative iceberg.  As providers of payment 
systems invest large amounts of capital in new technologies, they will continue to ask the 
 
the 1787 Constitutional Convention and How a Constitutional Transformation of the Nation’s Monetary 
System Emerged, NBER Working paper Series No. 11783, available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11783.  Nonetheless, there is no doubt that, under existing law, § 5103 is 
constitutional.  See infra text accompanying note XX. 
15 See, e.g., Nemser v. New York City Trans. Auth., 530 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1988) (holding that, although the 
Transit Authority was required to accept payment of fares in United States currency, the Transit Authority 
could impose reasonable restrictions on when and where it would collect such currency and that, therefore, 
requiring the use of a token to pay a fare was permissible).  In fact, the current understanding of the legal 
tender statute is that it applies only to pre-existing debts and that parties to an exchange need not agree to 
take cash.  
16 As we explain in more detail later, Metrocard is a stored value card that is used in the New York City 
subway system.  E-ZPass is a stored value card that uses a radio frequency identification transponder to pay 
fares on major highways throughout the Northeast and Midwest. 
17 For an overview of the effects of Check 21, see Sarah Malmfeldt, America Checks Into a New Banking 
Era With Check 21, 17 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 209 (2005). 
18 12 U.S.C. § 5003(a). 
19 12 U.S.C. § 5003(b)(2). 
 
6government to help ensure that the technology is a hit with the general public. 
 In recent years, of course, much literature has discussed satisfaction and 
maximization of preferences.  Most of this discussion falls well outside the scope of this 
paper.  For our present purposes, we accept that preferences are malleable and examine 
the extent to which it is appropriate and possible for the government to influence public 
acceptance and use of new payment systems.  We begin in Part I by describing in some 
detail the payment options that we discuss throughout the article.  Part II models how 
merchants and consumers decide whether to adopt and use a particular payment form, 
and then introduces the complications of network effects and multi-sided platforms.  In 
Part III, we briefly describe how, when it comes to payments systems, government may 
assume the roles of legislator, fiduciary, or seller.  Part IV then describes the tools that 
government has available to influence consumer preferences.  The Part discusses why 
steamrolling over consumer preferences is less risky in the world of payments than in 
other contexts.  We argue that, in order for new payment forms to flourish, the 
government often has to force the public’s hand by eliminating competing payment 
alternatives.  Finally, Part V explores where the payment industry is headed over the next 
decade, predicts what actions the industry might call upon Congress to take, and cautions 
that, notwithstanding our analysis in Part IV, such governmental intervention will often 
be unwise.   
 
Part I.  Payment Options Defined 
 
We begin by defining a few key terms.  Throughout this paper, we will sometimes 
refer to charge cards, rather than credit cards.  The term charge card means any card that 
permits the cardholder to make a payment using the card, with the amount charged to a 
third party, who then collects the funds from the cardholder.  Credit cards, as we use the 
term, refer to a subset of charge cards in which the third party permits the cardholder to 
defer payment of the funds and instead allows the cardholder to finance the charge 
through a revolving line of credit.20 This understanding of the relationship between 
 
20 As Professor Oren Bar-Gill has described credit cards, they “allow [the] holder to perform two distinct 
tasks: to transact quickly and efficiently, and to borrow—to finance a specific purchase, business, or way of 
7charge cards and credit cards accords with the historical development of such cards: 
charge cards, such as the Diners Club, American Express, and Carte Blanche cards, first 
arose in the 1950s as a way for (primarily) business travelers to make payments of 
lodging, food, and entertainment expenses without carrying cash.21 Credit cards, as a 
subset of charge cards, arose a decade later with the introduction of the BankAmericard 
(later, the Visa card).  As we will explore in more detail below, the availability of this 
line of credit helps to explain much of the spread of credit cards in the past few decades.22 
A payment device related to the charge card is the debit card. Like charge cards, 
debit cards permit the cardholder to make a payment to a merchant through a third-party.  
The important differences between charge cards and debit cards are that: (1) in the case 
of debit cards, the payment of funds to the merchant comes from a specified deposit 
account and (2) that the cardholder takes no further action in order to debit the funds from 
the account.  In other words, once a consumer initiates a debit card transaction, the 
consumer (generally) loses the ability to refuse to pay the funds; instead the funds are 
quickly debited from the deposit account.  In the case of all charge cards, in contrast, the 
cardholder continues to have the practical ability not to make payment to the card-issuer. 
 
life.”  Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction By Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1373, 1380 (2004).  In our account, charge 
cards refer to any card that performs the first payment function (what Bar-Gill refers to as the transaction 
function), while credit cards are those charge cards that combine the payment function with the credit 
function (what Bar-Gill refers to as the borrowing function).  As Professor Bar-Gill notes, the bundling of 
payment and credit functions explains many of the elements of the modern credit card industry.  See id. at 
1403. 
 Of course, we understand that the classic charge cards, such as the American Express green card, 
do involve the granting of short-term credit to the consumer.  See Sujit Chakravorti, Why Has Stored Value 
Not Caught On?, Emerging Issues Series, Supervision and Regulation Department, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Chicago (May 2005), at 6, available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/publicpolicystudies/emergingissues/pdf/S&R-2000-6.pdf.   Despite 
this fact, the credit granted by such cards is quite limited: the balance must be paid off at the end of the 
billing cycle.  In the case of credit cards, the time period for repayment can be indefinite. 
21 For descriptions of the historical story, see Bar-Gill, supra note 20, at 1380-83; Mann, Credit Card 
Policy, at 6-9; MARGARET C. JASPER, CREDIT CARDS AND THE LAW 1-3 (2d ed. 2000); DAVID S. EVANS &
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC 53-85 (2d ed. 2005). 
 Arguably, the first charge cards were retailer-specific cards, such as the oil-company cards that 
first appeared in the 1920s.  JASPER, supra, at 1; Bar-Gill, supra note 20, at 1381.  For our purposes, 
though, because we are focused on ways of making payments rather than means of obtaining credit, the 
more important innovation are the Diners Club, American Express, and Carte Blanche cards, because they 
were the first that created true national markets for the making of payments to multiple merchants. 
22 See infra text accompanying note XX. 
8Debit cards themselves are simply an extension of ATM cards, which were first 
introduced in the early 1970s.23 The first use of such cards to make retail purchases was 
in 1976, but consumers did not begin to take advantage of the debit function in 
widespread fashion until the 1990s.24 While most readers are familiar with the basic 
outlines of how such cards operate,25 there are important differences between the two 
main types of debit cards.  Online debit card transactions are processed through an ATM 
network, the same one that is used to obtain cash from an ATM machine.26 Just like the 
ATM withdrawals with which we are all familiar, such transactions are usually initiated 
by swiping the debit card and then entering a personal identification number (“PIN”).27 
Offline debit cards differ in that the transfer of funds is not accomplished through an 
ATM network, but instead through a credit card network, and generally requires only a 
signature, not the entry of a PIN.  The Visa Check Card is an example of this sort of 
offline debit card.28 
Stored value cards are products that have emerged over the last decade but have 
not yet gained wide acceptance.  Such cards involve the transfer of funds from a funding 
source to an electronic recording device on the card.  The sources of funds for such cards 
are quite heterogeneous: they can be funded by placing cash in a machine that then 
transfers the funds to the recording device, through the direct debit of funds from a 
deposit account, or even by a transaction charged to a credit card.  Perhaps the most 
successful examples of such cards are the Metrocard used on the New York City subway 
and bus lines and the SmarTrip farecard used on the Washington, D.C. Metrobus and 
Metrorail systems.  Both the SmarTrip card and the Metrocard are examples of closed-
system cards, which means that they can (generally) only be used to make payments to 
 
23 See FUMIKO HAYASHI ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE ATM AND DEBIT CARD INDUSTRIES 12 (2003), available 
at http://www.kc.frb.org/FRFS/ATMPaper.pdf.   
24 HAYASHI ET AL., supra note 23, at 14 & 41. 
25 For those who are not, the basic mechanic of a debit card is that it is an authorization by the payor to 
debit her checking or savings account a certain amount to make a payment to the payee.  HAYASHI ET AL., 
supra note 23, at 5.  The actual mechanics of how and when this occurs vary depending upon the network 
used, a topic we take up in the rest of the paragraph. 
26 See HAYASHI ET AL., supra note 23, at 44 (noting that all online debit networks are part of an ATM 
network). 
27 RONALD A. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
TRANSACTIONS 144 (2d ed. 2003). 
28 HAYASHI ET AL., supra note 23, at 8. 
9the entity that has issued the card.29 As we will discuss in more detail below, trials of 
open-system stored value cards in the United States have usually failed. 
 Often linked to stored value cards, but conceptually distinct, are so-called smart 
cards. This term is generally used to refer to any payment card that has a microchip 
embedded in the card that contains information.  In Europe, one of the primary uses of 
smart card technology has been to allow the embedding of a PIN on a microchip located 
on a credit card, which the consumer confirms when she makes a purchase with the 
card.30 The use of this anti-fraud technology has not caught on in the United States, 
perhaps because the telecommunications network is a cheaper and more reliable means of 
validating credit card purchases.31 Instead, American companies have sought to use the 
improved security that comes from a smart card to make stored value cards more reliable. 
 
Part II.  Merchant and Consumer Preferences 
 
With these key terms defined, this Part turns to a discussion of merchant and  
consumer decision-making.  Understanding our central inquiry—whether and how the 
government should attempt to alter the choices that consumers make about payment 
systems—first requires an understanding of how consumers are likely to make such 
choices.  The decision between payment systems occurs in two stages.  In the first stage, 
the consumer must choose to adopt a payment system as an option, as must the merchant.  
In the second stage, the consumer must decide which of the available payment systems to 
use.32 
29 Other examples of such closed-system payment cards include the stored value cards often issued by 
universities (including our own) and by the military.  See e.g., 
http://studentaffairs.shu.edu/campusid/piratesgold.html, last visited Nov. 16, 2005. 
30 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 21, at 7-8 & 300. 
31 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 21, at 7-8; Carol L. Clark, Shopping without Cash: The emergence 
of the e-purse, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES (4th Quarter 2005), at 34, 36.   
32 There are exceptions to this general rule that the choice of the particular payment system will be in the 
hands of the consumer.  For instance, as a matter of practice, it is merchants rather than consumers who 
have the choice on whether to convert a check to an ACH payment.  (For an explanation of ACH payments, 
see RONALD MANN & JANE WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (2d ed. 2005).  Formally, the consumer has 
been given notice of the merchant’s intent to convert check payments to ACH payments and then implicitly 
consented to the conversion by failing to object.  Nonetheless, the ultimate decision as to the use of ACH 
payments is left with the merchant.   
10
A.  Merchant Decision-Making 
 
For ease of exposition, we start with the merchant’s decision to accept a particular 
payment option.  For a merchant, the question is whether accepting a payment option will 
maximize profits.33 We hypothesize that the merchant will choose to adopt a payment 
system when it allows the merchant to maximize its return on its investment.  In the 
context of payments, this means that the merchant’s investment in a new payment system 
must exceed the return on other opportunities.   
The profit, P, that a merchant will make from the adoption of any particular 
payment system, X, is a function of both the additional revenues that the system will 
generate, AR, and the costs of the new system, C:34 
P(X) = AR – C .35 (1) 
 
Costs of a payment system can be further subdivided into two types: start-up costs, SC,
such as the initial fees to buy credit card processing terminals, and per transaction costs, 
TC,36 such as the cost of a phone call by an employee to verify a credit card, which leads 
to the following profit function: 
 
P(X) = AR – SC – TC.     (2) 
 
33 FISHER, DORNBUSHCH & SCHMALENSEE, ECONOMICS 129 (2d ed. 1988) 
34 For the moment, we lump together both start-up costs and per transaction costs, and we draw no 
distinctions between quantifiable and non-quantifiable costs. 
35 See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE ECONOMICS 315 (3d ed. 1993); see also Rochet & Tirole, supra note 
X, at 564 (noting the need to assume that new payment systems will attract new consumers). 
Of course, in theory, the profits and costs ought to be discounted to present value.  But because the 
start-up costs are likely small, and because the other costs and benefits are likely to be contemporaneous, 
we ignore this complication for now.  For a similar description of the investment decisions of payment 
providers and processors, see Sujit Chakravorti & Emery Kobor, Why Invest in Payment Innovations,
Emerging Payments Occasional Papers Series, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, No. 2003-1B, at 4 
(“[M]any investments are made with a long-term view where the firms’ expected net value of future 
earnings from the investment are greater than zero.”). 
36 By “per transaction costs,” we mean not just those costs that are charged on each particular transaction, 
but also those costs that are charged on a periodic basis, so long as the merchant continues to use the 
payment system, such as a monthly access fee.  Many vendors of credit card payment systems have such 
fixed charges associated with the payment system.  See, e.g., https://www.paypal.com/cgi-
bin/webscr?cmd=_display-pro-fees-outside (last visited May 11, 2006) (noting standard $20 monthly fee).   
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The merchant should adopt a particular new payment system over an alternative use, Y, 
when: 
 
P(X) > P(Y).       (3) 
 
Because we are discussing alternative uses of the same investments, we can 
assume for our present purposes that C(X) = C(Y).  This means that a merchant should 
adopt a new payment system when the additional revenues from the new payment system 
will exceed the additional revenues that would have been generated by an alternative use 
of the investment: 
 
AR(X) > AR(Y).      (4) 
 
As an example, consider the case of a restaurant that has to choose between spending 
$100 on additional advertising or on adopting a credit card system, which will impose a 
3% charge on credit card purchases.37 Assume that the availability of credit cards will 
increase the restaurant’s business by $1000 and that the alternative investment in 
advertising will generate $950 in business.38 Finally, assume that the marginal cost of 
producing the additional food is zero.  On this account, the restaurant should invest in the 
credit card system because the additional revenues from that system exceed the additional 
revenues from advertising, even after we account for the 3% fee paid to the credit card 
company.39 
Of course, the quantity of both the start-up and per transaction costs will still 
matter to the merchant’s decision on whether to adopt a payment system.  That is because 
 
37 We will treat the 3% fee as a discount on revenue rather than as an additional cost because the merchant 
never expends the fee; it is just a reduction in the payments the merchant receives from the credit card 
company. 
Note that in the real world, this percentage is too high, at least for a merchant dealing with 
transactions involving the presence of the actual credit card (known as “card-present” transactions).  
Ronald Mann estimates that the fees for “high-quality retail merchants” are typically 1.5 to 2%.  Mann, 
Credit Card Policy, supra note 21, at 44. 
38 The claim here is just that for a particular merchant, adding a credit card option might increase sales, not 
that credit cards or any other payments system increases the number of total sales, which is a different 
question.  See Edmund W. Kitch, The Framing Hypothesis: Is It Supported By Credit Card Issuers 
Opposition to a Surcharge on a Cash Price?, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 217, 223 (1990). 
39 That is because AR(X) = $1000 - $30 = $970, which is obviously greater than $950. 
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the larger those costs, the greater the additional revenues have to be in order to justify an 
investment in a payment system.  If the start-up cost for our restaurant to adopt the new 
system was $200, instead of $100, and if $200 in additional advertising would generate 
$1500 in additional revenue, then it would be quite clear that the restaurant should invest 
in advertisement rather than a payment system.  
 In the real world, however, we believe that for many merchants the start-up costs 
for a new payment system are relatively small, and that therefore the additional revenue 
that has to be generated is also relatively small.  For instance, a merchant who elects to 
start accepting charge cards has to pay almost nothing to buy the technology.40 Most of 
the costs for charge card acceptance consist of monthly maintenance and rental fees, 
which we categorize as per transaction costs.41 Thus, for merchants interested in a new 
payment system, the question is really whether the additional revenues of the new 
payment system, minus the per transaction costs, exceed the alternative profits that could 
have been generated by those same costs. 
 There are two final caveats we should mention.  First, in many cases, a new 
payment system will not increase revenues to the same extent that it might initially 
appear.  Returning again to our restaurant example, while the restaurant may generate an 
additional $1000 in business, it may also be that all of its consumers begin paying using 
credit cards.  If so, the actual amount of additional revenue is only $820, and the 
restaurant should instead spend the money on advertising, which would generate $950 in 
revenue. 
 Second, and more importantly, we need to emphasize that not all of the costs and 
(perhaps) not all of the “revenue” may be financial or even quantifiable.  For example, 
one such potential non-financial cost is the hassle cost associated with adopting and using 
a payment system.42 Merchants have to account for the time and effort that their 
 
40 Professor Ronald Mann estimates that the equipment costs are at most a few hundred dollars.  See Mann, 
Credit Card Policy, supra note 21, at 27.   
41 There are also, of course, the per-transaction fees, but as we noted above, see supra note XX, we view 
these as a discount on additional revenues, rather than as a cost. 
42 See Dan Ariely & Jose Silva, The Macro-Effects of Micro-Pricing: Behavioral Effects of Payment 
Methods and the Effectiveness of Micro-Pricing, Working Paper, Mar. 30, 2005 (noting the existence of 
hassle).  Hassle costs, as we are using the term, are similar to, but not the same as switching costs.  See e.g., 
CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 104 (1999).  We are assuming here that investment in 
one payments system technology does not preclude investment in another such technology; therefore, no 
switch needs to be made. 
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employees have to spend learning a new payment system (a start-up hassle cost) and the 
time and effort they spend running a credit card through a reader and then printing out the 
receipt (a per transaction hassle cost).  This investment of time and effort on the part of 
employees is a real cost to the merchants, because the employees could have been spent 
the time and effort on training to provide better service (in the case of the start-up cost) or 
on providing more timely delivery of another patron’s meal to her table (in the case of the 
per transaction cost).   
More speculatively, a merchant may adopt a payment system not just because of 
the revenues that will result, but because of the status that she thinks it will bring her; in 
other words, the restaurant might start accepting credit cards not because of the additional 
revenues, but because the owner wants to be seen as “high-end.”  This obviously requires 
a departure from the assumption of the merchant as a simple profit-maximizer, but we 
believe such a departure may be warranted for at least some subset of merchants.43 
B. Consumer Decisions to Adopt a Payment System 
 
Consumers’ decisions about whether to adopt a payment system into their 
respective portfolios of options ought to be similar, but not identical, to that of merchants.  
One difference is that, unlike merchants, consumers may not view the start-up costs 
associated with the adoption of a payment system as trivial, particularly when they are 
unfamiliar with it.  Consider E-ZPass, a form of stored value card used on highways in 
the Northeast and the Midwest.  In the E-ZPass system, a customer sets up an account 
with an E-ZPass member organization.  Customers usually fund and periodically refill the 
account with a credit card, although some customers use cash or checks.  Assuming that 
the account has money, the customer may pay her tolls on any E-ZPass participating 
highway by an automatic signal from a radio frequency identification (“RFID”) 
transponder.  Adopting E-ZPass involves a good deal of hassle start-up costs: the 
 
43 At least one commentator suggested to us that a merchant may need to offer a credit card option, not to 
increase revenues, but to maintain revenues when competitors start to accept credit cards.  We believe that 
this is a distinction without a difference.  At any given time, the question for the restaurant is whether the 
additional revenues from adding a credit card option, discounted to present value, exceed the discounted 
additional revenues that would be generated from an alternative investment.  When a merchant offers a 
credit card payment option to stave off defections by customers, this is additional revenue, because without 
the credit card option, there would be lower revenues in the future. 
14
customer must fill out an application, mail it in or submit it on-line, receive back the 
RFID transponder, and then attach the transponder to the car.44 Furthermore, if the 
customer does not use a credit card, the funding of the E-ZPass account with cash or 
checks can involve some additional hassle per transaction costs.45 
Just as a merchant seeks to maximize profits in its investment decisions, a 
consumer seek to maximize their expected utility, which is a function of the benefits and 
costs of any particular decision she makes: 
 
EU(A) = B(A) – C(A)       (5) 
 
The expected utility of an alternative choice is also a function of that choice’s benefits 
and costs: 
 
EU(B) = B(B) – C(B)       (6) 
 
Assuming that A and B are alternative payment systems, a consumer should pick the new 
system, B, when the expected utility of that system exceeds the expected utility of the old 
system, A, such that: 
 
EU(B) – EU(A) > 0,       (7) 
 
Or 
 
B(B) – C(B) – (B(A) – C(A)) > 0     (8) 
 
44 See http://www.ezpassnj.com/static/signup/ind_plans.shtml. (last visited Sept. 5, 2006). 
45 For consumers who pay by check, they must replenish the account by sending in a check in a timely 
fashion.  For those consumers who have neither a credit card nor a checking account, they must make these 
payments either by money order (which necessitates obtaining the money order) or in cash at an E-ZPass 
facility (which is usually relatively inaccessible).  For instance, in the state of New Jersey, there are only 
three E-ZPass service centers, and the state of New York has only eight, although for reasons we cannot 
fathom, there are actually two in and around Buffalo.  See http://www.ezpassnj.com/static/info/csc.shtml
(last visited Sept. 5, 2006); http://www.e-zpassny.com/static/info/csc.shtml (same). 
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As we saw in Equation 2 in the previous section, costs for payments systems consist of 
both the start-up costs and the per transaction costs:   
 
C = SC + TC        (9) 
 
Furthermore, consumers need not adopt a new payment system for all transactions; a 
consumer can choose to obtain a credit card, but still pay for most transactions with cash 
or check.  Therefore, what really matters to a consumer is whether there is some subset of 
transactions, i, for which Equation (8) is true:   
 
Bi(B) > Bi(A) + SC(B) + TCi(B) – TCi(A)46 (10) 
 
Unlike benefits and per transaction costs, we do not limit start-up costs to those for i
transactions, on the theory that the start-up costs are the same regardless of the size of the 
subset of transactions.  For instance, the costs of obtaining a debit card are the same 
regardless of whether the consumer will use it only to get cash from an ATM or will use 
it for all of her purchases.  In addition, we ignore the start-up costs associated with the 
pre-existing payment option, because those costs are sunk.  However, as we will note 
below, in some circumstances sunk costs may play a role in decision-making about 
payment systems. 
As an example, consider a consumer’s decision to obtain a new credit card.  As 
with the E-ZPass example above, there will be some start-up hassle costs in obtaining the 
card, and perhaps even a small fee associated with the card.  The real question for the 
consumer, given these start-up costs, is whether there is a set of transactions for which 
 
46 Professors Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole hypothesize that a customer should purchase a payment 
card only if the expected benefit exceeds the expected fee.  See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 
Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations, 33 RAND J. Econ. 549, 
553(2002).  Our analysis here is similar, but with some modifications.  First, we make clear the distinction 
between start-up costs for a system and per transaction costs, and we assume that the costs that really drive 
decision-making by consumers are not financial, but rather temporal and psychic.  (Rochet and Tirole 
describe the fee as the “customer’s yearly fee,” id. at 553, and not as a per actual transaction fee, suggesting 
it is just meant to cover up-front fees).  Second, our version recognizes that the benefit available to the 
consumer is limited to those circumstances where the benefits of a particular payment system are greater 
than those of other systems.  In other words, the benefit that Rochet and Tirole identify can only be 
calculated as a net against the existing benefits from other payment systems. 
16
the consumer’s additional benefits from having the card exceed the additional costs of 
having the card: 
 
Bi(B)– TCi(B) – Bi(A) + TCi(A) > SC(B)47 (11) 
 
Assume that in the past, the consumer has paid for her gasoline purchases using cash, but 
that her service station’s owner, who we will call Gas Co., is offering her a credit card 
with which to purchase gasoline in the future.  We will assume that the consumer 
receives no benefit from using cash and that the costs of obtaining cash are quite low.  
Furthermore, there are no actual financial costs for using cash (because she has ready 
access to her bank’s ATMs, which charge her no fees) and that the marginal hassle cost 
of getting cash for such transactions is quite low: say the discounted present value of such 
costs is $100.  Filling out the application and obtaining the card from Gas Co. involves no 
financial fee, but let us assume that there is a real hassle cost involved, and that this can 
be quantified as the equivalent of $50.  Furthermore, we will assume that Gas Co. offers 
her no benefit from the use of the card, although the transaction costs are reduced to 
$75.48 On this account, the consumer ought to decline the card, because it results in an 
expected net decrease in her utility: SC(B) = $50, while Bi(B)– TCi(B) – Bi(A) + TCi(A) 
= $25.
To remedy this problem, Gas Co. might introduce a rebate program that gives the 
consumer 5% cash back on all purchases made with the Gas Co. card over a calendar 
year.  If the discounted present value of that rebate is, say, $50, now the consumer should 
 
47 Admittedly, in theory we need to account for the lost opportunity cost on alternative investments of the 
start-up costs, as we did in Part II.A.  We do not do so here because we believe that such costs are generally 
quite low.  First, the lost opportunity cost for the investment of “hassle” just is, we believe, the hassle cost.  
For example, when a consumer fills out a credit card application, the hassle cost just is the lost opportunity 
of  watching ESPN or E! Channel reruns, or some similar activity  Of course, the consumer perhaps ought 
to have put that time to better use, but probably would not have.  Thus, for nonquantifiable costs, the 
concept of hassle at least incorporates the lost opportunity cost.  Second, for quantifiable costs, there is 
obviously a real lost opportunity cost that we are not considering; however, because we assume that these 
quantifiable start-up costs tend to be quite low (such as the cost of a postage stamp on the return of a credit 
card application), we cheat and ignore this problem. 
48 Even assuming that the consumer can be sure that she will never pay credit fees for running a revolving 
balance on the card, she still has the hassle of making monthly payments to Gas Co. and any financial fees 
involved in make such payments, such as the purchase of additional checks, etc. 
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adopt the card, because the start-up costs ($50) are outweighed by the net gain on the 
other side of Equation 11: $75. 
 One difficulty with consumer decisions about payment systems is that many of 
the costs are nonquantifiable costs, such as hassle costs, and that consumers will tend to 
be quite heterogeneous in how they value these costs.  Return again to our Gas Co. 
example.  We hypothesized that the consumer faced lower transaction costs for a credit 
transaction than for a cash transaction.  If such costs are limited to hassle costs, this may 
strike most readers as intuitively correct, because they pump their own gas and can pay 
with a credit card right at the pump, whereas cash payments may require going into an 
office, and may even require pre-payment.  The assumption does not strike us as 
intuitively correct, however, because we both live in New Jersey, where we cannot pump 
our own gas, and payments with cash are both quicker and generally friendlier 
(particularly in winter, gas station attendants do not relish trudging back and forth with 
credit cards while we sign).  A New Jersey consumer, therefore, may need a greater 
benefit to adopt the Gas Co. card than a consumer across the river in New York.  
Furthermore, the willingness of New Jersey consumers to adopt the card will vary with 
how much they disvalue the cost of paying with credit; some of us are simply less 
sensitive, both to the time loss and the unfriendliness of the attendants. 
 Another problem is that the nonquantifiable costs are, we believe, quite diverse.  
So far we have focused on the hassle of engaging in any particular transaction, but there 
are other potential costs.  For instance, consumers might be concerned not just with the 
hassle of using a credit card, but with the potential loss of privacy as well.  One “benefit” 
of cash transactions is that they generally leave no record, whereas credit card payments 
can generate a paper trail of exactly where a consumer has spent her money.  For 
instance, if one wants to hide certain transactions from a spouse, this is a powerful reason 
to pay cash rather than credit.49 
In addition, there is a risk of theft, both of money and of identity.  When a 
consumer adopts cash as a payment system, she obviously takes on the risk that she will 
 
49 This remains true even in an age when cash transactions, to the extent they involve an ATM withdrawal, 
generate some form of record.  It is a lot safer to pay $1000 for jewelry for your mistress using cash rather 
than using the credit card at Tiffany’s.  Somewhat plausible stories for the $1000 withdrawal are easier to 
generate than stories about who received the jewelry, not that either of us would know about this! 
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be robbed at some point and lose the cash in her possession.  The risk of this type of theft 
is lower with the adoption of a credit card or even a debit card system: in both cases, a 
consumer’s liability for unauthorized transactions is capped both by statute and by card 
company practice.  However, adoption of credit cards and debit cards may open up 
consumers to the possibility of identify theft, which can impose both financial and non-
financial costs. 
There is also the problem of sunk costs.  As Professor Richard Thaler has noted, 
“only incremental costs and benefits should affect decisionmaking.”50 But in reality, 
historical costs appear to affect the decisions that consumers make in the future.  
Consider again the consumer who has gone through the hassle of setting up an E-ZPass 
account and obtaining the RFID transponder.    Once the consumer has E-ZPass, the 
hassle becomes a sunk cost that the consumer ought to ignore (as a normative matter) in 
making decisions about how she will pay for particular tolls.51 Indeed, the consumer will 
inevitably encounter situations where the cash alternative is superior to E-ZPass, such as 
when the driver has coins readily available and the E-ZPass lines are longer than the 
others.52 But because ours is a positive model, we assume, in accord with the 
experimental evidence, that such sunk costs do affect consumer decisions about payment 
systems, such that previous costs incurred to obtain access to a payment system will 
make the consumer more likely to use the system.53 For instance, consumers who have 
paid for access to a charge card may be more willing to use that card in the future than 
they otherwise would be.54 
The benefits to consumers from various payment services can also be 
nonquantifiable and quite diverse.  As we have already suggested, the most obvious 
examples of financial benefits to adopting a payment system are reward or affinity 
 
50 Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 47 (1980). 
51 See id.  
52 On some roads, such as the Garden State Parkway, not all toll lanes accept E-ZPass. 
53 See Thaler, supra note 50. 
54 There are other transaction costs that may appear to be sunk costs but are not.  For example, say that a 
consumer is deciding whether or not to pay in cash or write a check for a purchase.  In order to write a 
check, the consumer would have first had to decide to purchase checks, which will necessarily have cost 
the consumer money.  Although this prior purchase of checks might be seen as a sunk cost, it is not. The 
consumer will correctly intuit that writing a check brings her closer to having to buy more checks: the price 
of a check is properly a cost of writing one.  This is actually (in our terminology) a per transaction cost for 
the consumer.  See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
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systems: either a small rebate on the purchase, or credit toward a reward (such as a free 
airline ticket).55 As for non-financial benefits, a consumer might value the ability of the 
payment system to generate a record of the transaction (the flip-side of our privacy cost 
point above).  Prestige or social standing is another potential benefit of some payment 
systems.  For instance, some people may pay with a “platinum” credit card instead of 
another credit card, not because the rate is cheaper or the hassle lower, but simply to gain 
the prestige that they believe is associated with having and using the card.56 In other 
contexts, some consumers may wish to use a payment system to indicate that they are 
“tech-savvy.”  For instance, when the New York City Transit Authority introduced the 
Metrocard, it believed that earlier users would be just such individuals.57 Of course, 
consumers may have completely idiosyncratic reasons for liking the older payment form.  
Think, for instance, of the 40-year-old who still eats Kraft Macaroni and Cheese.  We58 
can be fairly certain that, if he was tasting it for the first time, he would choose something 
else, but the whole point is that it is not his first taste.  As with food, familiarity and 
tradition may provide much of a payment system’s appeal.  For example, checks have 
proven remarkably persistent despite the many electronic alternatives, particularly for 
payment from remote locations.  The most common explanation for this persistence is 
that individuals are simply wedded to tradition.59 The comfort that comes from 
maintaining the tradition weighs in any decision toward maintaining the status quo.   
 Finally, because ours is a positive model, we focus in both this section and the 
next section on how consumers actually perceive the costs and benefits we are 
describing, not on the “real value” of these costs and benefits, even when they are easily 
quantifiable.  For example, to the extent that consumers fail to account for some real 
 
55 Mann, Credit Card Policy, supra note 21, at 43-44. 
56 See, e.g,, Kirk Johnson, Pending in Guilded Style, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1983, at § 3, p. 12; Carole Goul, 
Personal Finance: In Credit Cards, All that Glitters, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1986, at § 3, p.9; Jane Wolfe, 
Vicarious Consumption: Beyond the Glow of Platinum, Dec. 5, 1999, § 3, p. 10. 
 What may really matter is having, as opposed to using, the card.  But because possession of the 
card may be hard to signal without use, consumers use the cards to signal possession, which then signals 
social standing. 
57 See Matthew L. Wald, Fare Card Plan in the Subways Exceeds Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1994, at 39 
(noting that it was unclear if such people had actually adopted the Metrocard). 
58 Or at least Waldeck. 
59 Sujit Chakravoti & Carrie Jankowski, Forces shaping the payments environment: A summary of the 
Chicago Fed’s 2005 Payments Conference, Chicago Fed Letter No. 219, at 2 (Oct. 2005). 
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costs—for instance, they may not take into account the full costs of using a credit card—
we accordingly discount them.60 
C. Consumer Decisions to Use a Payment System 
 
This brings us to the second-stage decision: the consumer’s choice among 
payment systems for a particular transaction.  Our basic postulate is that a consumer will 
pick payment system B (say, a credit card) over payment system A (say, cash) for a 
particular transaction, j, when the expected utility for using the credit card exceeds the 
expected utility of using cash:  
 
EUj(B) > EUj(A).61 (12) 
 
In these expected utility functions, consumers weigh the benefits and per transaction 
costs of the competing payment options, because the start-up costs for both systems are 
now sunk, such that B should be selected over A where: 
 
Bj(B)– TCj(B) > Bj(A) – TCj(A)    (13) 
 
The other main important conceptual difference between Equation 11 and Equation 13 is 
that, here, the consumer is selecting a payment system not on the anticipated benefits and 
costs for a hypothetical set of transactions, but instead for a particular transaction.  In 
other words, at this stage the consumer (generally) will have better information about the 
actual value of the costs and benefits of a particular payment system.   
As an example, return to a consumer’s choice to adopt the card from Gas Co. and 
now assume that our consumer lives in New York and works in New Jersey.  In making 
the decision as to whether to adopt the credit card, she faces uncertainty as to where she 
is going to make her gasoline purchases.  On the one hand, if she makes all of them in 
 
60 See generally Bar-Gill, supra note 20, at 1395-1408 (giving a positive account of consumer choice within 
the credit card market). 
61 See also Wilko Bolt & Alexander F. Tieman, Skewed Pricing in Two-Sided Markets: An IO Approach,
DNB Research Papers (Oct. 2004), at 5-6, available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/dnb/dnbwpp/013.html. 
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New York (where again she pumps her own gas), it makes sense to get the card, because 
the transaction costs for credit are less than the transaction costs for cash.  On the other 
hand, if she makes all of her gasoline purchases in New Jersey, where we hypothesize 
that the transaction costs of credit outweigh the transaction costs of cash, then she should 
not adopt the card.  For the consumer in this situation, what drives the decision about 
adoption is information about the likelihood of gasoline purchases in New York or New 
Jersey. 
At the point of the decision to use the card, however, this uncertainty is obviously 
removed.  If she is purchasing gasoline in New York, it makes sense to use the card, 
because the marginal benefits of using credit over cash likely outweigh the marginal 
transaction costs.62 If she is instead purchasing gasoline in New Jersey, the marginal 
costs of using the card may outweigh the benefits, so the consumer will not choose to use 
the card.  The point is that at the time of the actual decision to use, the uncertainty has 
been removed.   
D.  Network Effects and Multi-Sided Platforms 
 
Up to this point, we have modeled the choices of consumers and merchants based 
upon an implicit assumption that the benefits and costs to the parties are independent of 
the choices made by other parties.  But that assumption is clearly wrong.  Payment 
systems are subject to network effects: the benefits to both consumers and merchants of 
adopting a new payment system turn, in large part, on the willingness of other market 
participants to adopt or use that payment system.63 Consider again Equations 4 and 11.  
The decision by a merchant to invest in a new payment system (Equation 4) depends 
directly upon the additional revenue to be generated by the system.  For there to be 
additional revenue, there must be consumers who have both adopted the new system and 
who will use it if the merchants offer it.  If no potential customers of our hypothetical 
restaurant have adopted the credit card, nor are likely to do so, then the restaurant is 
 
62 This may not always be true, even in New York.  The marginal benefits of use of the card, if they are 
limited to the rebate, are likely to be constant.  The marginal transaction costs could, however, vary.   
63 Of course, the decision to use the payment system is not dependent in this way upon the willingness of 
merchant’s to adopt the system: the ability to make a decision about use depends in the first instance upon 
the merchant’s decision to have adopted that payment system.  
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unlikely to see any additional revenue, and it is fairly certain that an alternative 
investment would make sense.   
A consumer’s decision to adopt a payment system (Equation 11) is similarly 
dependent upon merchant adoption of the system.  Recall that the following condition 
must be fulfilled for a consumer to adopt a payment system: 
 
Bi(B)– TCi(B) – Bi(A) + TCi(A) > SC(B)   (11) 
 
The greater the number of transactions in which new system B can be used, the more 
likely it is that we can identify some subset of such transactions for which Equation 11 
will be true.  For instance, we suggested in our Gas Co. example that the use of a 5% 
rebate might be enough to get a consumer to adopt the card, depending upon the hassle 
costs, and we also hypothesized a scenario in which use of the card in New York made 
sense, but not in New Jersey.  However, if not all Gas Co. stations take the card, or she 
also buys gasoline at the stations of other companies that do not accept the card, then her 
benefit from using the card will be lower, and perhaps insufficient to overcome the start-
up costs of adopting the card.  On the other hand, if she can use the card not just to make 
gasoline purchases at Gas Co., but food purchases at Fast Food Co., then her benefits 
from the card may be even greater, making adoption of the card that much more likely.  
The point is that merchant decisions to adopt a payment system increase the set of 
possible transactions in which the conditions of Equation 11 for consumer adoption will 
be met. 
 Not only are payment systems subject to network effects, but they are also multi-
sided platforms. David Evans and Richard Schmalensee define such markets as having 
three basic characteristics: (1) there are at least two distinct types of customers for the 
product; (2) there is some benefit to be obtained from coordinating members of the 
groups; and (3) there is an intermediary that, through coordination, can make the 
members of the groups better off.64 Examples of such multi-sided platform networks 
include operating systems (which make both software developers and computer users 
better off), television stations (which make both advertisers and viewers better off), and 
 
64 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 21, at 134-35.   
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payment systems (which have the potential to make both consumers and merchants better 
off).65 Because they are multi-sided platforms, the benefits to a party of the network do 
not depend upon the number of similar parties that are on the network, but instead upon 
the number of parties there are on the other side of the platform. For instance, a video 
game user traditionally did not care how many other players use a particular gaming 
system; what she really cared about is how many video games are developed for the 
system.66 Of course, sometimes the existence of other users on the same side of the 
platform will be an additional benefit to a network, but the key to any such network is 
having enough users on both sides of the platform.  For instance, if your colleagues are 
watching your favorite television show, water cooler talk might enhance your enjoyment 
of it.  But regardless of how much viewers enjoy a show, it will be cancelled unless 
sufficient numbers of advertisers are interested in the program.67 
A multi-sided platform network presents the very difficult chicken-or-the-egg 
problem:68 unless both sides of the transaction can be convinced that they are better off 
with the new payment system, it will not be adopted.  And the presence of network 
effects means that the willingness of, say, consumers to adopt the new system will 
depend on merchants also adopting it.  The result, as commentators have noted, is that 
“[t]o gain critical mass in the marketplace, payment providers have to convince 
simultaneously a large number of participants of the benefits of new payment 
mechanisms.”69 Thus, the consumers and merchants whose behavior we model above are 
not isolated from each other; rather, a merchant considering whether to adopt a new 
payment form considers whether consumers are likely to adopt the same form, and vice 
versa. 
 
65 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 21, at 136-38. 
66 This may be less true now, as more gaming systems have remote multi-player games. 
67 As a recent example, consider the demise of the CBS show, Joan of Arcadia.  While the show was 
plagued by declining ratings, the real factor leading to cancellation in 2005 seems to have been the age of 
its average viewer: 53.9.  See Fans demand 'Joan', fight CBS over cancellation, USA Today, May 30, 2005, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/2005-05-30-joan-arcadia-fans-petition_x.htm.   That number 
made the show very unattractive to advertisers, who prefer younger viewers.   
68 This exists whenever payors and payees must adopt a new technology simultaneously for it to be 
successful, “otherwise there is little incentive for consumers or merchants to embrace the new instrument.”  
Chakravorti & Kobor, supra note X, at 7 n.12; see EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 21, at xiii. 
69 Sujit Chakravorti & Carrie Jankowski, Forces Shaping the Payments Environment: A Summary of the 
Chicago Fed’s 2005 Payments Conference, 219a Chicago Fed Letter (October 2005), available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/cfloctober2005_219a.pdf.
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E.  The Difficulty of Achieving a Critical Mass 
 
The rub, however, is that consumers and merchants are unlikely to be easily 
convinced that they have the same interest in adopting (and using) a new payment 
system.  As Equations 4 and 11 illustrate, the conditions under which consumers and 
merchants are likely to adopt a payment system are different.  We predict that a merchant 
will adopt a payment system whenever the additional revenues gained from adoption of 
the system outweigh the additional revenues that could be generated from another 
investment of those resources.  For their part, consumers will adopt a new payment 
system only where the start-up costs for adopting the system are outweighed by the 
increase in net benefits and costs from moving to the new system for some set of 
transactions.   
Not every new payment system, though, will satisfy both Equations 4 and 11.  As 
an example, recall the introduction of stored value cards on the Upper West Side, where 
Equation 4 for merchants appears to have been satisfied, but not Equation 11 for 
consumers.  Here, merchants appear to have had quite limited start-up costs, which 
suggests that the additional revenues from the cards need not have been great for 
merchants to be willing to offer them.  Furthermore, to the extent some consumers 
converted from cash to the use of the stored value cards, merchants presumably would 
have seen additional revenues in the form of a reduced risk of theft of the funds by 
robbers or employees. 
For consumers, however, it does not appear that Equation 4 was satisfied.  The 
stored value cards in this experiment were distributed as microchip-based smart cards 
placed onto debit cards, which were then sent by the banks involved to their customers 
who lived on the Upper West Side.  In the existing payments universe at the time, stored 
value cards competed with cash and (to a lesser degree) debit cards.70 It is hard to see 
any set of transactions in which the stored value card was better than either cash or a 
debit card.  Consumers had to load the stored value card at an ATM, so the card involved 
 
70 The experiment was initiated in 1997.  At the time, debit cards were a fast-growing subset of payments, 
but still a fraction of what they are today.  See HAYASHI ET AL., surpa note 21, at 41-43. 
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just as much hassle as getting cash, and had no lowered costs or added benefits.  Indeed, 
the cards were not safer than cash because, assuming a consumer was robbed of her cash, 
her cards were likely to be taken as well, and the stored value would be lost.71 Stored 
value cards also did not improve the consumer’s position as compared to debit cards, 
because both could be used for the same kind of transaction, and presumably most 
merchants who were wired to accept stored value cards would also accept debit cards.  In 
addition, debit cards, which required the use of a PIN, had additional security.  The “cash 
back” feature of debit cards also allowed greater access to funds.   In sum, no set of 
transactions existed for which consumers would prefer stored value cards.  Thus, even if 
the start-up costs associated with the cards were quite low, consumers simply had no 
incentives to adopt them. 
Despite the absence of benefits to one side of the transaction, a new payment 
system can still thrive if the payment platform provider can internalize both some of the 
gains of one party and the costs of the other party, and thereby make adoption of the 
system more likely.  One way to do this is for the platform provider to give a benefit to 
one side of the platform to stimulate adoption.  For instance, in our Gas Co. example, we 
imagined the consumer being given a 5% rebate as a way of encouraging adoption.  In 
the real world, similar examples exist.  For instance, while general use stored value cards 
have not succeeded in the market, proprietary stored value cards have had more success.  
In such transactions, the merchant and the platform are the same entity (as they are in our 
Gas Co. example), and therefore the merchant/platform can internalize the costs to the 
consumers by directly offering other benefits to the consumer to entice use of the card.  
For instance, Starbucks has heavily promoted its Starbucks Card, which is a stored value 
card that consumers can use to make purchases in the store.  Between October and the 
end of December 2005, consumers placed more than 35% more value on Starbucks Cards 
 
71Professor Leo van Hove suggests that stored value cards may be better for consumers than cash, because 
they do not have to worry about exact change, transaction time is similar, they do not have to carry a bulky 
wallet or purse containing bills and coins, and they may be able to reload the device at home, removing the 
need to go to a phone.  Leo van Hove, Electronic Purses in Euroland: Why Do Penetration and Usage 
Rates Differ?, SUERF working papers (on file with author) (manuscript at 11-12.  All of these benefits 
(except the last one), applied to the New York trial.  Professor van Hove’s analysis (which was not aimed at 
the New York trial) ignores that, at least for an initial adopter, some of these benefits did not exist because 
not all merchants accepted the cards.  Furthermore, to the extent cash had been downloaded to the card, it 
then became unavailable to use to pay cash-only merchants. 
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than they had a year earlier.72 At first, such increased usage is perplexing, given that 
consumers can use cash or offline debit cards at most Starbucks locations.  However, a 
large portion of the loaded value in the quarter represents money placed on gift cards: 
almost 75% of the value placed on the cards occurred in one of the three months–
December.73 The question, of course, is whether individuals who received the gift cards 
will reload them with their own funds.  To this end, Starbucks has taken another initiative 
to get consumers to use the Starbucks Card: it has tied the Starbucks card to a credit card, 
the Duetto card.  At the end of each month, the consumer automatically receives a reward 
in the amount of 1% of the purchases made on the Duetto credit card over that month.   
Another complication for initiating a new payment platform is the fact we noted 
in Part II.B: the benefits from the use of a payment system are more varied and they 
include potentially substantial non-financial benefits to a particular system.  Furthermore, 
some of these benefits may tend to lock a consumer into an existing payment system in a 
way that merchants are not locked in.  In the Starbucks example we just used, some 
consumers may tend to continue using a store-branded stored value card out of loyalty: 
being seen by others as a regular Starbucks consumer may bring them some value.  For 
many other consumers, though, there will be no such value to possession of the Starbucks 
card, and this consideration will play no role in their decision to use (or more likely not 
use) the card. 
This heterogeneity in the value of payment systems to consumers is a problem in 
gaining acceptance of the systems.  Many of the benefits offered by service providers to 
entice one set of consumers to use a particular payment system will have no value to most 
other users.  As a result, even if payment providers succeed in attracting a small number 
of consumers to the new payment mechanism, they will not obtain a critical mass.   
The history of charge and credit cards provides an example of this phenomenon.  
Charge cards, particularly the American Express card, experienced substantial growth 
through the 1950s, 60s and 70s.  The overall penetration of charge cards nonetheless 
remained quite low by our present standards: by 1977, American Express (which was by 
 
72 See Starbucks Coffee Company Fiscal 2006 First Quarter Financial Results Prepared Remarks, Remarks 
of Michael Casey, February 1, 2006, at 17. 
73 Id. 
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this time the dominant pure charge card) had “merely” 8 million cardholders.74 Indeed, 
the peak penetration of charge cards into American households occurred in 1989, when 
13% of Americans had such cards.75 The difficulty for charge cards was and is that their 
benefits as a payment system are limited.76 
Credit cards, by comparison, have experienced far greater market penetration.  In  
1970, the percentage of American households holding a credit card was only 16%—
roughly the same percentage at which charge cards reached their peak.77 By 2001, the 
market penetration of credit cards had exploded to almost 73%.78 Credit cards have done 
so much better than charge cards over the last thirty-five years because they offer a wider 
range of benefits to consumers, leading to wider acceptance of the cards by merchants, 
which in turn has led to even more use by consumers.   
What differences between charge cards and credit cards led to these wildly 
divergent outcomes?  The most important is the ability of credit cards to extend a 
revolving line of credit to consumers.  This is, in itself, a benefit that may often lead 
consumers to use a credit card over other options.  Furthermore, changes in both 
technology and the law made it easier to offer revolving credit to consumers in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  With the rise of computer technology and information processing, credit card 
issuers were better able to identify consumers who would be both interested in adopting a 
card and profitable for the payment provider.  Furthermore, after the Supreme Court 
decided that local usury laws would generally not restrict the interest rates charged by 
credit card companies,79 it became profitable to lend to consumers who had previously 
been deemed too risky.80 The increased profits available from lines of credit then 
allowed credit card issuers to draw in other consumers through reward and affinity 
 
74 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 21, at 67. 
75Id., at 89. 
76 Of course, we are not trying to suggest here that charge cards have been a failure.  Charge cards continue 
to be an important part of the electronic payments universe.  Our point is simply that, compared to credit 
cards – indeed, even compared to debit cards – charge cards have been relatively unsuccessful.  This lack 
of success is particularly noteworthy given that charge cards existed before credit cards. 
77 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 21, at 89. 
78 Id.at 89. 
79 Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Service Corp., 439 US 299 (1978). 
80 The actual holding in Marquette National Bank was that a “national bank” was only restricted by the 
usury laws of the state in which it was located, not by the laws of the state in which its customer was 
located.  439 U.S. at 301.  The practical effect of the decision, though, was that most large banks legally 
resided in jurisdictions such as South Dakota and Delaware in which there were no caps on interest rates.  
See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 21,at 69-70. 
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programs.  The net result was a wide range of benefits that allowed credit cards to vastly 
increase their market share.81 
The importance of satisfying the heterogeneous interests of potential users raises a 
broader point about efficiency.  As we have previously discussed, payment systems have 
financial costs for merchants and consumers.  Often, an emerging payment system will 
hold the promise of net financial gains for users on both sides of the platform.  But if the 
payment provider does not find a means of satisfying or overriding the disparate interests 
of potential users, the system will not be widely adopted.  Because emerging payment 
forms often have lower service costs than their pre-existing competitors, improvements in 
payment systems can create clear economic benefits.  But the market, left to itself, will 
not always adopt the most efficient system.  That is, the payment system with the lower 
service cost may not be able to obtain a critical mass of users, at least not in the absence 
of government intervention. 
 
Part III. Governmental Roles  
 
Our central inquiry is whether and how the government can influence public 
preferences about payment systems, so as to increase the likelihood of success for a 
particular payment form.  In the context of payments, government assumes multiple 
roles: fiduciary, seller, and law-maker.  What government can and should do depends in 
part on the role that it has assumed.  In this Part, then, we briefly examine the government 
in each of these roles. 
As fiduciary, the federal government has two closely related goals: (1) to ensure 
that payees will accept coins and currency, and (2) to increase the demand for coins and 
currency by encouraging consumers to use new forms.  These goals are intimately 
 
81 The same basic logic applies to merchants, of course.  But because we assume that merchants, as a 
whole, are more driven by pure financial concerns in picking payments systems than consumers are, we 
assume that they are less heterogeneous than consumers.  Having said that, there are certainly 
circumstances in which the benefits of a particular payment system are insufficiently attractive to particular 
merchants that at least one subset of merchants refuses to adopt the new payment system.  Indeed, a recent 
example of this was the long reluctance of Waffle House restaurants to accept credit cards.  Sue Stock, 
Waffle House Caters to the Cash-Free, The News & Observer (Raleigh, North Carolina), Feb. 21, 2006 at 
C11.  For Waffle House, the reluctance to allow credit cards had been designed to keep costs (and thus 
prices) down.  Id. Had enough merchants followed Waffle House’s lead over the last thirty years, there is 
no chance that credit cards would have succeeded in the fashion they have.  
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connected because if payees refuse particular coins and currency, then payors are 
unlikely to use them.  For instance, the Treasury Department introduced new colors on 
the $20 bill in 2003, the $50 bill in 2004, and on the $10 bill in 2006.  Between 1996 and 
2000, the Treasury introduced updated versions of the $5, $10, $20, $50, and $100 bills.82 
In support of many of these changes, the Treasury Department undertook substantial 
advertising campaigns to ensure both payee acceptance and payor use of the new bills.  
Less successfully, the Treasury Department has also attempted to gain support for dollar 
coins on several occasions.83 
While “fiduciary” is probably the government’s most well-known role with regard 
to payments, it is increasingly common for government to act as seller; that is, for the 
government to design a payment system for a service it purveys. Governmental agencies 
have long created payment systems for the collection of fares connected with both public 
and private transportation; in particular, they have encouraged and in some cases even 
required the use of tokens to pay fares both on toll roads and on buses and trains.84 In the 
electronic age, governmental agencies have put strong pressure on riders and drivers to 
cease paying fares and tolls in cash and instead to adopt new, electronic forms of 
payment.  For instance, drivers all along the East Coast have been encouraged to adopt E-
ZPass by the liberal use of discounts in tolls.85 Similarly, when the New York City 
Transportation Authority first introduced Metrocards, discounts were considered essential 
to obtaining consumer acceptance of the cards.86 
In its third role as law-maker, the government attempts to influence consumer 
choices in situations where it is neither the seller of services nor the fiduciary of the 
payment system.  Instead, the government provides laws or regulations that work to 
 
82 See Website of Bureau of Engraving and Printing; 
http://www.moneyfactory.gov/newmoney/main.cfm/currency/history (last visited Sept. 5, 2006). 
83 John P. Caskey & Simon St. Laurent, The Susan B. Anthony Dollar and the Theory of Coin/Note 
Substitutions, 26 JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 495 (1994). 
84 See, e.g., Nemser, supra (noting NYCTA=s requirement that fares be paid using tokens). 
85 Joe Malinconic, Will it Be E-ZCome, E-Z Go?, THE STAR-LEDGER (NEWARK, NJ), Nov. 29, 2004, at 13; 
Joe Malinconico, Turnpike Targeting E-ZPass Discount, THE STAR-LEDGER (NEWARK, NJ), Nov. 11, 2004, 
at 19 (noting discounts given in New York and New Jersey).  Similar tactics have been used in Illinois to 
get drivers there to adopt the similar I-Pass.  See Gene Amromin et al., Inducing more efficient payment on 
the Illinois Tollway, Chicago Fed Letter (Apr. 2006). 
86 Richard Perez-Pena, Transit Agency Plans Its First Volume Discounts, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 26, 
1996, at A1; James C. McKinley, Jr., Despite Big Push, New Yorkers Snub Transit Card, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1994, at A1; Douglas Martin, Fare Cards: A Glimpse of the Future Underground, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 7, 1994, at B3. 
30
improve the social acceptance of a particular payment system.  Check 21, enacted in 2003 
and discussed in the Introduction, is the most recent example of this sort of governmental 
action.87 
When the government acts as law-maker, it may have little direct interest in the 
underlying payment system.88 For instance, the government has only a small financial 
interest in the existence of a robust check collection system, and therefore little direct 
interest in whether substitute checks succeed or fail.89 When the government acts as 
seller, it obviously has a much larger financial stake in the success of enterprises such as 
Metrocard and E-ZPass.  Similarly, the government’s interest in the checking system is 
qualitatively different than its interest in payment systems when it acts a fiduciary: the 
acceptance of substitute checks does not appear to be vital to the continued functioning of 
the economy in the way that the acceptance of United States currency is.  
The government does, of course, have a general interest in payment systems.  
After all, as we noted in the previous Part, some payment systems are more efficient than 
others.  Efficiency is generally good for society, so the government has reason to promote 
it.90 The government, however, also has an interest in being responsive to the other 
subjective preferences of consumers (and perhaps even merchants).  After all, efficiency 
is not (nor should it be) the only criterion by which to judge governmental action.  
Indeed, as we discuss later,91 politicians who disregard subjective preferences may pay a 
heavy price at the ballot box.  But in the next Part, we assume that the government has a 
legitimate interest in changing endogenous preferences about payment systems in pursuit 
of efficiency and perhaps other goals.  We thus proceed to examine and evaluate the tools 
government has at its disposal.   
 
87 Public Law 108-100; 12 U.S.C. § 5001-18 
88 Of course, the government has an indirect interest in whether society is using the most efficient payment 
system.  Changes in how people make payments can result in societal economic gains.  See Wilko Bolt et 
al., The Effect of Truncation Pricing on the Adoption of Electronic Payments: A Cross-Country 
Comparison, Working Paper No. 05-28, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (Nov. 2005), available at 
http://www.phil.frb.org/files/wps/2005/wp05-28.pdf. 
89Indeed, the Federal Reserve generally attempts to set its check collection fees so as to cover its associated 
costs.  See http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/testimony/1997/970916a2.htm (last visisted Sept. 5, 
2006). 
90 See supra Part II.E. 
91 See Part IV.D.2. 
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Part IV.  Affecting Preferences and Network Effects 
 
Whether and how the government affects payment preferences depends on the 
role that the government has assumed, its precise goal, and the particular sort of payment 
system at issue.   Depending on the situation, the government may (a) provide 
information that allows individuals to coordinate their behavior, (b) pass legislation or 
adopt policies aimed at reducing or eliminating concerns about a particular payment 
form, (c) provide incentives to induce individuals to adopt new payment systems, or (d) 
force change by eliminating or curtailing the older payment form.  The next section 
examines these options, each of which represents an incremental increase in the amount 
of pressure placed on potential users of the new payment system.92 
A. Focal Points and Information 
 
As our earlier discussion of network effects suggested, payment systems require 
coordination: in order for a consumer transaction to occur, the seller needs to accept the 
payment form that the buyer tenders.  The most innocuous means of facilitating 
coordination is for the government simply to provide information about different 
payment forms.  The legend required by Check 2193 is one example of this approach, as is 
the advertising campaign that accompanied the issuance of the revamped $20 bill.  In 
both these examples, government action helped ensure that the public recognized a 
particular payment form as legitimate.   
At a minimum, these sorts of informational efforts should ensure that a seller 
accepts particular methods of payment, at least when the method of payment requires no 
additional investment on the seller’s part.  As a very simple example, a buyer may offer 
an updated $20 when purchasing groceries.  If the seller does not know that the bill is 
legitimate, and the buyer does not have any alternative means of payment, the 
coordination failure could result in a lost sale.  But if  the government has informed the 
seller through advertising of the bill’s legitimacy, she is likely to accept it.  Similarly, a 
 
92 Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995). 
93 “This a legal copy of your check.  You can use it the same way you would use the original check.”  See 
supra text accompanying note 19. 
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seller who demands proof of payment is likely to accept a substitute check, provided she 
knows it is the legal equivalent of a traditional cancelled check.  At the very least, then, 
government-supplied information helps ensure that individuals will accept one form of 
payment when they really prefer another. 
 As previously suggested, however, the success of a new payment form depends 
on overcoming the chicken-or-the-egg problem; not only does the public have to be 
willing to adopt the new form, but merchants must be willing to accept it, which in turn 
depends on merchants anticipating that a sufficient number of users will be on the 
opposite side of the platform.  Government-provided information may influence use 
when it emphasizes the benefits of one payment form relative to another.  For instance, 
when the Mint launched the Sacagawea one-dollar coin, it purchased a commercial that 
featured a vending machine repeatedly rejecting a frustrated individual’s one-dollar bill.94 
The Mint ultimately decided against airing the commercial,95 but we can easily imagine 
how a commercial demonstrating Sacagawea’s consumer advantages would encourage 
use.  That is, consumers would be initially attracted to the coin, vendors would anticipate 
this attraction, and consumers would similarly anticipate that vending machines would 
accept the coin.  In other words, informational campaigns suggesting that one payment 
form is superior to another might influence network effects by both affecting the 
willingness of people to consider using the payment form in the first instance, and by 
influencing the predictions people make about the behavior of individuals on the other 
side of the platform.  
Particularly when government is acting as fiduciary and seller, however, it may 
want to do more than just ensure use and acceptance of a particular payment form.  
Instead, it might desire that a particular payment form dominates.  The government 
introduces the dollar coin, the Metrocard, or some other payment method because it sees 
an opportunity to increase efficiency and correspondingly reduce costs.  As such, the 
government may try to make a particular payment form the focal point around which 
 
94 United States General Accounting Office, New Dollar Coin: Marketing Campaign Raised Public 
Awareness but not Widespread Use, at 21 (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter Marketing Campaign]. 
95 Some Treasury officials believed that there was an informal policy to avoid comparing the dollar coin to 
the dollar bill, or to otherwise negatively compare the two forms of payment.  Id. 
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individuals will voluntarily coordinate their behavior.96 
As used in the economics literature, “focal point” refers to the place where 
individuals who need to coordinate their behavior gravitate.  In Thomas Schelling’s 
famed example, for instance, two parachuters who are unexpectedly separated must find 
each other.  Schelling illustrates how one point on their maps may be focal, or the place 
where each would expect the other to go in order to meet up.97 Richard McAdams uses 
Robert Sugden’s Crossroads game to illustrate how government speech can create focal 
points.98 In the Crossroads game, two cars approach an intersection on different roads.  
Both drivers prefer to maintain their respective speeds and have the other driver yield.  
Each driver’s paramount interest, however, is in avoiding the collision that would occur if 
they both maintained speed.  McAdams discusses how the state can erect signs that, 
independent of any legal sanction, act as focal points that allow drivers to coordinate 
whether to yield or continue forward.99 Note that in both the parachuter and Crossroads 
examples, what is dominant or focal may not reflect an individual’s personal preference.  
That is, the parachuter who is many miles away from the focal bridge may prefer to meet 
elsewhere, just as the driver whom the sign instructs to yield would prefer to continue 
forward.  In each example, however, the individual subverts his own subjective 
preference because the need to coordinate is paramount. 
One might expect that government-provided information is particularly likely to 
influence the public’s choice of a particular payment system.  Richard McAdams has 
posited that the law influences behavior because it creates expectations about how others 
will behave, and that people then coordinate their behavior around these expectations.100 
McAdams argues that the law is particularly effective at creating focal points, because (a) 
new laws often receive publicity, which helps create expectations; (b) legal expression is 
unique, and thus stands out from competing expressions; and (c) legal officials have a 
reputation for correctly predicting future behavior.101 All of these factors make the legal 
 
96 See generally, Richard McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000). 
97 Thomas C. Schelling, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 55 (1970). 
98 McAdams, supra note 96, at 1704-05. 
99 Id. at 1706. 
100 Id.at 1651. 
101 Id. at 1666-71. As McAdams points out, this reputation is a byproduct of the publicity and uniqueness of 
the legal message.  These two factors make the law an effective focal point.  Legal officials may appear to 
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message louder, and thus more focal, than alternative messages.  While McAdams is 
careful to note that loudness does not depend on the morality that is often associated with 
the law, he concedes that the legitimacy of the law matters because it further helps 
distinguish the legal message from the rest.102 
McAdams’ argument suggests that the government should be especially effective 
at making a particular payment system focal.  Because the national government acts as 
fiduciary, it has particular legitimacy when speaking about payment methods.  While this 
is most obviously true when the message concerns United States coins and currency, the 
authority should spill over to matters that are not directly connected to what constitutes 
legal tender.  Moreover, the message should be highly salient when the government is 
selling a service like transportation; the message, after all, informs the buyer which sort 
of payment the seller prefers. 
The Crossroads and parachuter examples, however, should illustrate the difficulty 
of convincing individuals to coordinate around a payment form that runs counter to their 
own preferences.  Each example offers only one opportunity to coordinate, which stands 
in stark contrast to the realities of payment systems.  That is, the parachuters’ maps may 
show many possible meeting spots, but unless each parachuter independently decides to 
go to the same place, they will not survive.  Similarly, one driver has to yield and the 
other has to go, or else the cars will crash or indefinitely stall.   
With payments, however, myriad alternatives allow for coordination.  That is, so 
long as alternative payment methods retain their legitimacy, the consumer does not risk 
coordination failure when she eschews a specific payment form.  Most sellers will accept 
more than one form of payment; if a seller does accept only one form, it usually will be 
currency and coins, which everyone uses to some extent.  Government-supplied 
information may influence expectations about how many users will be on the opposite 
side of the platform, and therefore may affect the willingness of merchants and 
consumers to adopt a payment system.  After all, in equations (4) and (11), merchants 
and consumers are attempting to make predictions about the likelihood of increased 
 
simply be predicting future behavior, when in fact the law they promulgate actually shapes behavior.  Id. at 
1672. 
102 Id. at 1670. 
 
35
utility from adopting the new system, and information supplied by the government about 
use by parties on the other side of the transaction can naturally alter these calculations.  
But information alone is unlikely to lead to increased use.103 When the customer chooses 
among the payment systems she has already adopted, she knows which of her options the 
merchant will accept.  Thus, coordination is beside the point.  The question, then, is what 
else the government can do to affect decisions to use payment systems. 
 
B. Gently Addressing Particular Concerns  
 
Sometimes the refusal to use a new payment method may result from a particular 
concern about one or more aspects of the new method.  For example, as credit cards 
became increasingly popular in the 1960s, the possibility of theft and unauthorized 
charges received much the same kind of attention that identity theft receives today.104 
Congress responded to this concern in 1970, when it amended the Truth in Lending Act 
to provide that credit card holders are responsible for no more than $50 worth of 
fraudulent charges.105 At about the same time, Congress established specific criminal 
penalties for the fraudulent use of a credit card.106 As another example, in 1978, 
Congress noted that while “the use of electronic systems to transfer funds provides the 
potential for substantial benefits to consumers,” it was nonetheless problematic that the 
“rights and liabilities of consumers” were undefined.107 Thus, as part of its Electronic 
Funds Transfer Act, the federal government limited an account holder’s liability for 
unauthorized electronic fund transfers to $50.108 
In all of these examples, the government spoke to consumers in its legislative 
role.  These statutes simultaneously reassure consumers and endorse the controversial 
 
103 We acknowledge that focal point information may generate increased use through the mechanism of 
sunk costs: if the information provided led to the consumer adopting the payment system, those costs may 
become sunk costs that then lead the consumer to increase use of the system.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 50-54.  Otherwise, though, information about coordination should have no effect on decisions to use a 
system. 
104 See e.g., He Who Steals My Purse Steals My Credit Cards, TIME  (June 19, 1964) (available at 
www.time.com/time/archive/printout/0,23657,871192,00.html).  
105 15 U.S.C § 1643. 
106 15 U.S.C. § 1644.  
107 15 U.S.C. § 1693. 
108 15 U.S.C. § 1693g. 
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payment form.  The statutes limiting liability directly address a source of consumer 
reticence by ensuring that the financial institution, not the consumer, bears the risk of 
fraud.  The statutes thus actively and visibly eliminated one barrier to widespread use, 
and thereby underscored governmental support for the new payment system.  As for the 
statute imposing criminal liability, it also sent a message to consumers: that the 
government took credit card theft seriously and was taking steps to prevent it.  Some 
consumers may have believed that with a criminal statute in place specifically addressing 
credit card fraud, fewer individuals would engage in fraud in the first instance.  All of  
these statutes, then, illustrate an approach in which the government behaves more 
proactively than when it simply provides information and attempts to create focal points 
around which individuals can coordinate.   
In addition to addressing particular concerns about fraud, the statutes influence 
network effects, albeit gently.  Because these statutes remove a barrier to use, they make 
both consumers and merchants more confident that the particular payment system will 
become widespread.  With this increasing confidence, more consumers, merchants, and 
institutions will invest in the new payment method.  Their actions will have a feedback 
effect: as others become aware of this investment, they too will adopt the new form, and 
so forth.   
 
C. Providing Incentives or, Alternatively, Imposing Sanctions 
 
Sometimes, however, no particularized concern animates an individual’s decision 
to eschew a payment form.  Instead, the reticence is purely the result of the (perhaps 
irrational) preferences of individuals.  When preferences are particularly strong, effective 
government action must make the benefits of the new payment form either larger or more 
tangible, or, alternatively, must make the non-user internalize the cost that her preference 
imposes on third parties.  In other words, effective governmental action must incentivize 
use of the new payment form, or—depending on one’s perspective—sanction use of the 
old payment form.   
Such incentives can be quite effective.  For example, Metrocard did not become 
popular with New York City subways riders until the transit authority offered free bus 
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transfers to Metrocard users,109 and discounted tolls often contribute to a highway 
driver’s decision to use electronic payment.110 More indirect incentives may be effective 
as well.  For instance, highway authorities can increase the number of lanes dedicated to 
electronic payment and decrease the number dedicated to traditional payment; after such 
tinkering, non-electronic users will experience the “cost” of even longer lines.  Indeed, 
some highway authorities have gone so far as to reserve certain freeway entrances to 
electronic payers.  Each of these incentives, whether direct or indirect, magnifies the 
costs of sticking with the old payment method. 
 In all these examples of incentives, of course, the government is acting as seller.  
This is unsurprising, because incentives are often expensive, at least in the short-term.  
When the government is acting as seller, it may have good reason to internalize the costs 
of incentives, because the long-term benefits from a switch in payment systems will 
outweigh the short-term costs.  The problem for payment systems is that it may not 
always be possible to find a party to internalize the network externalities of the system, 
because the availability of profit opportunities may be limited.  The most obvious 
example of this involves situations where the government is acting as a fiduciary.  
 The story of the Susan B. Anthony dollar coin illustrates the problem.  John 
Caskey and Simon St. Laurent have persuasively argued that the coin failed because the 
government did not understand the importance of network effects or the economic theory 
underlying coin/note substitutions.111 When the government launched the Susan B. 
Anthony in 1979, it was confident that the public would accept the coin and predicted 
widespread circulation within three to four years.  The coin, however, was a colossal 
flop: 
 
Despite the mint’s emphasis on designing a coin suitable for vending machines, 
most machines were not recalibrated to accept it.  Vendors had begun updating 
their machines before the law passed, but as of 1979, only 250,000 of the four 
million vending machines had been updated.  The cost per machine was $25 to 
$350 per machine, and given these costs, most vendors preferred to wait to see if 
the coin would become widely used before converting their machines . . .   
 
109 Andy Newman, Hop On, Hop Off, The Unlimited Metrocard Arrives, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1998 at B1. 
110 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
111 John P. Caskey & Simon St. Laurent, The Susan B. Anthony Dollar and the Theory of Coin/Note 
Substitution, 26 J. Money, Credit & Bank. 495 (1994). 
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At the same time, the media, public and retailers were criticizing the coins for 
looking like a quarter, making it hard to distinguish.112 Consumers complained 
about other features of the design, including color, reeded edge, and thickness.  
Because consumers did not want the coin, cashiers rarely offered it as change.  
Consumers declined to accept the coin from retailers as change, merchants 
returned the coin to banks, and banks, unable to distribute them and facing high 
storage costs, sent the coins back or did not reorder new ones.113 
By January 1980, only 291 of the 750 million coins produced were in circulation.  In 
March 1980, the government altogether stopped production of the Susan B. Anthony 
dollar. 
The obvious problem with the Susan B. Anthony coin was network externalities.  
Merchants who were deciding whether to accept the Susan B. Anthony were aware of the 
accompanying costs, which included retooling vending machines or creating space in the 
cash register drawers and the risk that employees would confuse the coin with a quarter 
when counting money.  From the merchant’s perspective, accepting the coin made sense 
only if a large number of consumers would be presenting the Susan B. Anthony and if the 
merchant was likely to lose sales if she did not accept the coin.     
As we have discussed previously, however, consumers had an incentive to adopt 
the coin only if a sufficiently large enough number of transactions existed where the 
benefits of the coin overcame the costs imposed by adopting the coin.114 In this particular 
context, such situations were pretty limited.  The main benefit of the coin was that it 
weighed less than the equivalent amount of quarters and would facilitate purchases in 
vending machines under then-existing technology.  The costs came in two forms: first, 
the hassle of learning to identify the Susan B. Anthony as readily as other coins, and 
second, having to forgo transactions with vending machines or other merchants that did 
not yet accept the coin.  Because at the beginning few vending machines accepted the 
coins, the costs here generally outweighed the benefits.115 The resulting equilibrium was 
 
112 This was a questionable criticism at best.  The Susan B. Anthony was 43 percent heavier than a quarter, 
had the same size relation to the quarter as the quarter does to the nickel, and different engraving.  Id. at 
501. 
113 Id. at 500. 
114 See supra text accompanying notes 44 - 60. 
115 Of course, this is a generality and does not speak to all consumers or vendors.  It is plausible that for 
some consumers, the benefits of the coin outweighed its costs.  This could be either because (a) they 
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such that neither merchants nor consumers had an incentive to begin using the coin, and 
unsurprisingly, the Susan B. Anthony dollar was a flop. 
In contrast to the Susan B. Anthony, credit cards initially faced a similar 
challenge but managed to overcome it.  As S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis have 
noted more generally as to network externalities, the failure to adopt a new, superior 
standard represents “a profit opportunity for someone who can figure out a means of 
internalizing the [network] externality and appropriating some of the value made 
available from changing to the superior standard.”116 In other words, in some cases, an 
entrepreneur who can innovate a way to profit from the creation of a platform will find 
ways to internalize the network externalities in order to facilitate adoption of the payment 
system.117 An example of this again is the growth of first the charge card industry, and 
then the credit card industry, over the past 50 years.  In the first part of the story, charge 
cards went through a period of rapid growth following the creation of the Diners Club 
card because the founders of that card realized that they could make profits by extracting 
a high merchant discount fee (~7%) and giving the card to consumers at a fairly low cost 
(and a $5 annual fee).118 In other words, Diners Club, and then American Express, were 
 
disproportionately had access to machines and merchants that accepted the coins and/or (b) they liked the 
coin—in other words, they obtained some sort of psychic benefit from having the coin.  The existence of 
such a core of consumers will overcome the network externalities, however, only when it leads to what 
Professors Shapiro and Varian refer to as a virtuous cycle of positive feedback: a situation where other 
consumers and merchants adopt the product – here the coin – because they believe that others are also 
adopting the product.  See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 42, at 173-77.  Furthermore, in our view, 
payment systems generally share the same trait as information technology products: they are based on 
demand-side economies of scale.  Id. at 179-80.  That is, often the costs of producing the backbone of a 
new payment system are (relatively) small, and they do not fall significantly as the supply of such items 
increases.  Instead, what drives the market is that the demand for the product increases as other participants 
adopt the system.  As Shapiro and Varian note, this has a “beautiful if frightening implication: success and 
failure are driven as much by consumer expectations and luck as by the underlying value of the product.  A 
nudge in the right direction, at the right time, can make all the difference.”  Id. at 181.  Although Shapiro 
and Varian refer to consumers, in the context of multi-sided platforms like payment systems, it is both sides 
(merchants and consumers) who need to demand the product.  For instance, as John Caskey and Gordon 
Sellon recognized in 1994, what was then holding back the debit card industry was not the lack of 
consumer demand, but merchant demand: consumers mostly had the means to make debit purchases—in 
the form of ATM cards—but merchants had to be convinced to purchase the equipment to process them.  
See John P. Caskey & Gordon H. Sellon, Jr., Is the Debit Card Revolution Finally Here?, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City Economic Review 79 (4th Quarter 1994).   
116 S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1, 4 (1990). 
117 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 21, at 136. 
118 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 21, at 54 & 59 (noting that the fee in 1958 dollars was $5).  At the 
time, Diners Club earned roughly 70% of its revenues from merchants. 
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able to internalize the costs of getting the cards into the hands of consumers by extracting 
higher profits from merchants.119 
In the second part of the story, as we described in Part II, credit cards became one 
of the dominant forms of payments in the United States when credit card issuers learned 
that they could make profits from the credit function of a credit card, which in turn 
allowed the company to offer the payment service of the card at a lower price.120 This 
bundling of products – the payment product and the credit product – was not enough, 
however.  The second important innovation was the improvements in the revolving credit 
industry that allowed credit card issuers to make greater profits from the issuance of such 
credit.  Essentially, this created what might be seen as a three-sided platform market, 
involving merchants and two types of consumers: those who are only transacting and 
those who are financing.  Credit card issuers also became more sophisticated in the 
marketing of their credit product and in their ability to decide to whom they should 
extend credit and under what terms.121 These innovations allowed them to (mostly) 
eliminate annual fees, cut the costs charged to merchants,122 and expand the contexts in 
which such cards could be used.123 In other words, credit cards grew as a payment 
system because card issuers were able to extract more profits from consumers using the 
 
119Id. at 150. 
120 See supra text accompanying notes XX-XX 
121 Mann, Credit Card Policy, supra note 21 at 9-10 (describing rise of credit sharing bureaus and 
computerized information processing as crucial to making credit underwriting more profitable); Bar-Gill, at 
1388-94 (describing methods card issuers use to market cards to consumers). 
122 See Mann, Credit Card Policy, at 50 (noting the drop in interchange fees from 6% to 2%).  Interestingly, 
the interchange fee of American Express charge cards remains higher (3%), in large part because American 
Express is unable to offset the interchange fee revenues with profits from the extension of credit.  Id. 
123 For instance, in the 1990s, Visa and Mastercard revoked their long-standing rules that credit cards could 
only be used in transactions in which the cards were physically present.   Allowing consumers to use credit 
cards in mail order and telephone order transactions (and later, in Internet transactions) has the obvious 
effect of increasing the attractiveness of such cards because it increases the potential set of transactions in 
which such cards can be used.  The cost is increased opportunities for fraud.  The actual costs of such 
fraudulent purchases are generally passed on to the merchant (as opposed to fraudulent card present 
transactions, where the direct costs are absorbed by the banks).  This might suggest that the card companies 
have elected not to internalize the externalities of expanding credit cards into these markets.  The amount of 
such fraud, though, has dropped from 15% to below 1%,, a result that we believe is the result of substantial 
sums spent by the card companies on programs such as Verified by Visa.  See MANN & WINN , supra note 
32, at 582-83. 
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cards for financing services and thereby cut the costs of the cards to purely transacting 
parties, which led to more merchants accepting the cards.124 
The obvious question that arises, then, is why did the market not solve the 
problem for the Susan B. Anthony in the same way it did for credit cards?  The answer, at 
least in the case of the Susan B. Anthony dollar, is that the profit opportunities for 
overcoming the network externalities were close to non-existent.  There were no widely 
available additional products that could be bundled with the coin to underwrite its 
adoption.125 Moreover, the government – the supplier of this particular multi-sided 
platform – could not subsidize one side of the platform by extracting extra payments from 
 
124 In their book, Evans and Schmalensee ignore this second story, we assume because they see the 
financing function as separate from the transacting function of credit cards.  See, e.g., EVANS &
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 21, at 150.  While we agree with them that charge cards arose initially in 
reaction to the platform created by Diners Club and that the financing function was separate from the 
transacting function, see supra note XX, we reject the implicit notion that the bundling of the financing and 
transaction function has had no effect on the industry.  We remain convinced that the growth of credit cards 
over the past 25 years has been the direct result of the credit function helping to subsidize the transaction 
function.  See also supra text accompanying notes XX-XX. 
Of course, one interesting issue is why competition in the provision of credit to consumers did not 
lead to the bundling of credit products with other goods and services.  In other words, why do we not see 
consumer credit provided at cheaper rates than credit cards provide, or at least why we do not see the 
provision of credit services tied to products other than charge cards?  Professor Bar-Gill’s paper provides 
perhaps part of the answer: the structuring of the transactions in credit cards leads consumers to 
underestimate the likelihood that they will use the credit function.  Bar-Gill, supra note 20, at 1395-1401 & 
1404.  Consumers become sort of accidental borrowers, such that they use the credit services even though 
they never thought they would at the time they contracted for the services.  That answer, though, is not a 
complete one, for it does not answer why other services have not been similarly structured to create such 
“accidental” borrowing.  For instance, why not tie the sale of cell phone services in the same way?  A cell 
phone company might provide a low cost product, with the understanding that all unpaid balances would be 
rolled over into a credit product just like with a credit card.  Why do we not more frequently see such 
arrangements?  The answer, as we will describe below, is that we may be seeing exactly this development. 
125 It is not impossible to imagine a hypothetical product that might do this.  Say, for instance, that a vendor 
stood to make significantly more profits if consumers switched from using quarters to the coin.  Imagine a 
soda company whose products are generally $1 (remember, this is just imaginary).  Also suppose that the 
soda company, by fostering adoption of the Susan B. Anthony dollar, might save large amounts in the 
collection and transportation of coins from vending machines such that it is willing to give consumers a 
discount for purchasing with a dollar coin rather than with another assortment of change.  Under these 
circumstances, the soda vendor’s decision might give consumers sufficient incentive to adopt the coin that 
it initiates a virtuous cycle of positive feedback, leading to widespread adoption of the coin, particularly if 
enough other vendors did the same thing. 
 We can imagine at least two reasons why this did not happen with the Susan B. Anthony coin.  
First, it is unlikely that the cost savings to merchants of the coin over quarters were sufficient to give them 
an incentive to give any sort of discount for such purchases.  Second, as others have noted, discounts to 
prices for using a particular payment service seem to be disfavored in the market.  See supra note XX 
(describing the failure of cash discounts to take hold, despite merchants’ incentives to prefer cash payments 
over charge card payments).  The reason for this reluctance may be that if a particular vendor had attempted 
the discount strategy, other vendors may have preferred to compete not by also offering the discount, but 
instead by offering equal prices to consumers, rather than cash discounts.  The competitor’s slogan might 
be “You never have to worry about what sort of change you have when you buy a Brookdale soda!” 
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another side.  Of course, the government could have paid merchants and/or consumers to 
use the coin, but the complete absence of a discussion of that possibility in the literature 
suggests that it is beyond the pale.126 
The strategy adopted by the credit card issuers is not the only way for a party to 
try to overcome network externalities and promote a new payments system.  As 
Professors Shapiro and Varian point out, there are two basic ways to internalize switching 
costs.  The first is to reduce those costs by making it easier to switch products.  This was 
the method used by the charge card industry to get consumers to adopt the cards in the 
1950s and 1960s.  The second way is to increase the benefits available from the new 
network, thereby making the benefits of the switch outweigh its costs.127 Increased 
benefits may make a payment system essentially irresistible to one side.  For instance, 
restaurants and hotels accepted charge cards despite the quite high initial discount fees 
because the cards attracted additional well-heeled customers.  Thus, in our example of the 
Susan B. Anthony coin, the government might still have succeeded if it was putting forth 
a product that had much greater benefits for both consumers and merchants.  But in 
reality, the coin was not a radical improvement from the perspective of either group, and 
therefore was doomed to failure.  
What our analysis suggests so far is that the role the government plays largely 
determines how far it will go to influence preferences about payment systems.  When the 
government is acting as seller, the cost savings associated with a particular electronic 
payment form may spur the government to offer incentives, which in turn may overcome 
strong individual preferences and network effects.  When the government is acting as 
law-maker, in contrast, it is likely to limit itself to providing information and addressing 
 
126 In truth, the government already subsidizes all forms of currency in its role as fiduciary.  See EVANS &
SCHMALANSEE, supra note 21, at 30 (noting that “many of the costs of cash are hidden in the government’s 
budget”).   
127 Professors Shapiro and Varian refer to these approaches as (a) the evolution strategy of compatibility 
and (b) the revolution strategy of compelling performance.  SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 42, at 190-91.  
They later clarify, though, that the evolution strategy “centers on reducing switching costs so that 
consumers can gradually try your new technology,” id. at 192, and that the revolution strategy focuses on 
“offer[ing] a product so much better than what people are using that enough users will bear the pain of 
switching to it,” id. at 195.   
 Evans and Schmalensee similarly suggest that two ways to solve the problem are to cut the price 
for one side, perhaps to even pay that side for adoption, or to “invest in one side of the market.”  EVANS &
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 21, at 143.  Obviously, cutting the financial costs, or even paying a party to 
adopt a new system, is a way to reduce the switching cost, whereas we see decisions to invest in the market 
as a way for a system supplier to offer a better product to that side of the market. 
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particularized concerns, and leave the incentivizing to the third-party institutions that 
stand to gain from consumers making the switch.  But so far, our analysis has suggested 
that when the government is acting as fiduciary, it is relatively powerless in the face of 
strong subjective preferences or network effects.  That is, even when the government is 
“smart” about influencing preferences, it is likely to be unsuccessful. 
 
D. Withdrawing Alternative Payment Forms 
 
The Sacagawea dollar coin is another case in point.  The launch of “The Golden 
Dollar”128 was accompanied in 2001 by a $67 million marketing and education 
campaign.129 The Mint initially shipped large quantities of the coin not only to the 
Federal Reserve, but also to Wal-Mart and other retailers, all in an effort to promote 
widespread use.130 The coins were also give-aways in Cheerios boxes, at sporting events, 
and at various transit hubs.  These promotions distributed more than 132 million coins to 
consumers.  The Mint also conducted outreach to merchants in industry sectors that were 
most likely to use the coin and increased the use of the coin in federal facilities, such as 
post offices and military bases.   
As almost any reader can deduce from looking in her pockets, all of these efforts 
were of little avail.  While the Mint’s efforts dramatically increased public awareness of 
the coin, it had little effect on actual use.  Demand for the coin was highest in the first 
year of the launch and declined rapidly thereafter.  In 2004, a General Accounting Office 
poll found that 97 percent of Americans had not used the coin in the past month and that 
74 percent could not remember ever using one. Because hindsight is twenty-twenty, it 
may initially be difficult to see why the roll-out of the Sacagawea was “smart.”  But in 
fact, the Mint acted on almost every suggestion that had been made by experts who had 
studied the Susan B. Anthony.131 Indeed, the government, in a very limited fashion, even 
did what we suggested earlier was beyond the pale; that is, it paid merchants and 
 
128 United States General Accounting Office, New Dollar Coin: Public Perception of Advertising, at 1 
(April 2000). 
129 Marketing Campaign, supra note xx, at 5. 
130 Id. at 22-23. 
131 This is not to say that the launch of the Sacagawea was flawless.  In particular, the GAO noted some 
barriers in distributing the new coin and the difficulty of obtaining a reliable supply of new coins, as well as 
higher delivery fees by armored carriers.  Marketing Campaign, supra note 94, at 3. 
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consumers to use the coin, in the sense that it gave more than 132 million away for free 
during promotionals.132 But in the face of particularly strong preferences and network 
effects, the government, acting as fiduciary, was unable to convince consumers and 
merchants to switch. 
 To be sure, the Mint could have pushed consumers and merchants toward 
widespread use of the Sacagawea by withdrawing the competing dollar note.  Indeed, 
most experts agree that in light of public resistance to using a dollar coin and the 
“psychological cost associated with a change of a habit,”133 no dollar coin will succeed 
until the dollar bill is withdrawn from circulation.134 In the countries that make up the G-
7, the United States is the only one that attempts to co-circulate a high-denomination coin 
and a note of the same value.135 Other G-7 countries, such as Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan, have succeeded in introducing high-denomination coins by 
withdrawing the competing note.136 This, in turn, suggests that, even when government 
is unable to provide strong incentives or to create a payment form that has a much greater 
benefit for both consumers and merchants,137 it can ensure the success of the payment 
form by eliminating or severely curtailing the alternatives. 
1. Forcing the Public’s Hand 
 Withdrawing or curtailing the competing payment system may initially seem 
counter to the current wisdom among those who study how the government can most 
effectively influence social behavior.  Dan Kahan, for example, has theorized about 
situations in which lawmakers attempt to change pervasive social norms, such as the 
belief that “no sometimes means yes” or that it is acceptable to drink and drive.138 Kahan 
has argued that “gentle nudges” are more effective than “hard shoves,” or in other words, 
that lawmakers can change prevalent social norms with a series of incremental measures 
aimed at gradually affecting public opinion.  As one example, Kahan contrasts the 
ineffective tobacco prohibitions of the early 20th century with the “pattern of escalating 
 
132 Id., at 9. 
133 Quote from Lotz & Rocheteau, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. 
134 E.g., Marketing Campaign, supra note 94, at 18; Caskey & St. Laurent, supra note 83, at 507.   
135 Marketing Campaign, supra note 94, at 20. 
136 Id. 
137 See supra text accompanying notes 161- 62. 
138 Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problems, 67 U. Chi. Law 
Rev. 607, 633 (2000).  
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change” that began with warning labels in the 1960s and culminated with severe 
restrictions on public smoking in the 1990s.139 Kahan argues that the former were 
“contemptuously defied”  because outright prohibition condemned smoking more 
strongly than most of the public did, and that the latter succeeded because it helped 
“ground an emerging perception of smokers as deviants, as well as an emerging 
expectation that individuals conform to the anti-smoking norm.”140 
Kahan summarizes his argument this way: 
 
If the law condemns . . . the conduct substantially more than does the 
typical decisionmaker, the decisionmaker’s personal aversion to condemning too 
severely will dominate her inclination to enforce the law, and she will balk.  Her 
reluctance to enforce, moreover, will strengthen the resistance of other 
decisionmakers, whose reluctance will steel the resolve of still others, triggering  
a self-reinforcing wave of resistance.   
If, however, the law condemns the behavior only slightly more than does 
the typical decisionmaker, her desire to discharge her civic duties will override 
her reluctance to condemn, and she will enforce the law.  Her willingness to 
enforce will now strengthen the willingness of other decisionmakers to enforce. . . 
. In the resulting wave of condemnation, lawmakers will be able to increase the 
degree of condemnation reflected in the law without prompting resistance from 
most decisionmakers.141 
In other words, laws aimed at changing norms will be successful if they gradually pull 
public opinion forward, but will produce detrimental backlash when they attempt to force 
a sudden change of public opinion.  While Kahan is primarily concerned with questions 
of norm management, preferences are relevant here too.  Whether a decisionmaker 
complies with the law is a function of the interaction between “her personal degree of 
condemnation and her preferences to discharge her legal obligations.”142 
However, our study of payment systems suggests that, sometimes, changing 
preferences necessitates hard shoves; that, without them, preference change will be 
unsuccessful.143 So why, in this context, should the government sometimes force the 
 
139 Id. at 626. 
140 Id. at 627. 
141 Id. at 608. 
142 Id. at 613. 
143Kahan notes two instances in which hard shoves are unlikely to produce backlash.  The first is when 
“there is widespread consensus against the norm that the law is trying to change or suppress”; the second is 
when “dissensus about a norm radically polarizes society.”  Id. at 619-20.  Neither of these examples 
explains why hard shoves are effective in the context of payment systems. 
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public’s hand?  The answer hinges on condemnation, which, as the above quotation 
suggests, is central to Kahan’s analysis.   
For the most part, Kahan’s hard shoves are ones that involve the criminal law; his 
hypothetical decisionmakers are prosecutors, jurors, and sentencing judges.  A criminal 
conviction and the resulting punishment symbolize condemnation by one’s fellow 
citizens.  Kahan hypothesizes that decisionmakers resist hard shoves because they are 
unwilling to condemn; that is, when the law punishes behavior more severely than the 
decisionmaker would prefer, the decisionmaker will sometimes choose not to enforce the 
law. 
But while condemnation is inherent in the criminal law, the decision to forego a 
particular payment method is unlikely to form the basis for condemnation.  Take, for 
instance, the individual who steadfastly refuses the Sacagawea coin.  Even the hardest 
possible shove—that is, the withdrawal of the competing note—will not be seen as 
condemnatory, regardless of whether most individuals favor or disfavor the coin, or are 
simply ambivalent about it.  Payment systems are usually just not the sort of stuff that 
gives rise to moral posturing.  The refusal to condemn is what produces Kahan’s self-
reinforcing wave of resistance.  When the possibility of condemnation disappears, so 
does the risk of a “self-enforcing wave of resistance” that bolsters the very norm the 
government is seeking to change.144 Because there is no condemnation in the context of 
payments hard shoves are more effective than gentle nudges. 
 2. Three Illustrations 
Three examples, two historical and the other contemporary, help illustrate the 
point.  The historical examples stem from the need to finance the Civil War and require a 
bit of exposition.  The contemporary example is the adoption of the euro, a story with 
which most readers will be somewhat familiar.  Taken together, these examples not only 
show the effectiveness of hard shoves, but also demonstrate that “hard shove” is not 
synonymous with “the most heavy-handed measure possible.”  The examples also 
demonstrate that while governments do not have to worry about preference backlash 
when they are not engaging in condemnation, they are nonetheless restrained by political 
consequences. 
 
144 Id. at 608.  
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We begin with demand notes and the legal tender provision.  Prior to the Civil 
War, the federal government conducted its business in specie, i.e., through the use of 
coined money.  As the cost of the Civil War began to vastly exceed projections, the 
United States borrowed through demand notes to help close the gap between revenue and 
expenditures.  These demand notes did not bear interest and were paid to government 
employees and suppliers in lieu of coin.  As their name suggests, the notes initially 
entitled the bearer to obtain specie from the Treasury upon demand.  In 1862, however, 
Congress issued demand notes that were redeemable in interest-bearing bonds, not in 
specie.  Congress further specified that these demand notes (colloquially known as 
greenbacks) were “lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and 
private, within the United States.”145 This was, of course, the predecessor to our present 
legal tender statute. 
Because the legal tender provision required government creditors to accept 
demand notes, its potential consequences were profound.  If legal tender is competitively 
priced in the marketplace, the receiver should be largely indifferent between accepting 
the tender or another market equivalent.  If the receiver prefers a different form of 
payment, such as specie, she can simply exchange what was tendered, with little loss of 
value.146 But if the tender is artificially set above its market value, the creditor has gotten 
less than the market equivalent in other goods or monies.  The creditor thus will prefer 
some other form of payment over the legal tender.147 
This is precisely what unfolded during the inflationary period of the Civil War.  
Gold quickly rose to a premium against greenbacks, at one point reaching a high of 185 
percent.148 Creditors who were owed a $100 debt would have preferred $100 in coin, or 
at least the amount of greenbacks that equaled the gold value of the debt.149 Legal tender 
provisions, however, prevented the creditor from acting on this preference; instead, the 
creditor simply had to accept $100 worth of greenbacks in satisfaction of the debt. 
 
145 Act of February 25, 1862, sec. 1, 12 Stat. 345. 
146 Farley Grubb, The U.S. Constitution and Monetary Powers: An Analysis of the 1787 Convention and 
How a Constitutional Transformation of the Nation’s Monetary System Emerged, at 5-6 (copy on file with 
authors). 
147 Id. at 6. 
148 Kenneth Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 367, 374 (citing MITCHELL, GOLD, PRICES 
AND WAGES UNDER THE GREENBACK STANDARD 4 (1908)). 
149Id. at 374. 
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The legal tender provision was a particularly hard shove and was (and still is) of 
questionable constitutionality.150 What is most relevant for our purposes, however, is 
how the legal tender provision eliminated the complications of network effects.  In our 
discussion of the Susan B. Anthony, we suggested that the coin failed because: (a) the 
government lacked profit opportunities that would have allowed it to subsidize either 
consumer or merchant use, and (b) the coin did not offer greater benefits for consumers 
and merchants, such that they would opt for the coin in the absence of such subsidies.  
Similarly, demand notes were markedly less beneficial than specie from the creditor’s 
perspective, and any subsidy flowed from the creditor to the government, not the other 
way around.  Compared to demand notes, then, the Susan B. Anthony was the greatest 
thing in monetary policy since the demise of the fei.151 But because the government used 
the hard shove of the legal tender provision, creditors had to accept them. 
The 10 percent tax on state bank notes was another hard shove that stemmed from 
the government’s effort to finance the Civil War.  After the charter of the second Bank of 
the United States expired in 1836, the federal government temporarily withdrew from 
supervising the nation’s banking.152 Banks created under state law flourished.  By 1861, 
more than 1600 of these banks existed, and, until the issuance of demand notes, state 
notes functioned as the nation’s only non-coin currency.  Many of the notes traded at a 
discount from face value, depending on public confidence in the issuing bank and the 
distance from the community in which the notes had been issued.153 The sheer number of 
notes and the confusion over their value created conditions that were ripe for 
counterfeiting, and thus fraudulent notes circulated as well.154 As one historian has 
described, “As far as paper money was concerned, the chaos was almost 
indescribable.”155 
150 See Hepburn v. Griswold (striking down legal tender provision); Knox v. Lee (overruling Hepburn and 
finding legal tender legislation constitutional).  For a discussion of the Framer’s intent regarding legal 
tender, see generally Farley Grubb, supra note 146; Dam, supra note 148, at 382-90.  
151 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, MONEY MISCHIEF 3-4 (1992) (describing the medium of exchange on island of 
Uap, where natives used fei, that is, stone wheels that were so large they needed to be rolled from one 
person to the next.)  
152 For a full account of the rise and fall  of the Second Bank of the United States, see HAROLD 
UNDERWOOD FAULKNER, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 157-60 (8th ed.). 
153 Id. at 511.  
154 Dam, supra note 148 at 375. 
155 FAULKER, supra,note 152, at 511. 
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The National Bank Act of 1863 (as amended in 1864 and 1865) changed all this.  
The Act authorized nationally chartered banks, which were permitted to issue a new form 
of paper currency known as the National Bank Note.  These new national banks were 
subject to much stricter regulation than their state bank competitors.  The national banks 
had to satisfy minimum capital requirements, to refrain from making speculative loans, 
and to back up deposits with specified reserve amounts.  In addition, banks that issued 
National Bank Notes had to own at least an equal amount of United States government 
securities.156 These regulations placed the nationally-chartered banks at a serious 
competitive disadvantage with the state banks.157 Congress countered this competitive 
threat by placing a 10 percent tax on the issuance of state bank notes, which were the 
state banks’ primary source of income.  The 10 percent tax made the issuance of state 
notes “virtually prohibitive,”158 and state bank notes quickly disappeared from 
circulation.  Without this source of income, the number of state banks dropped to fewer 
than 250 by 1868.159 The traditional story of the 10 percent tax, then, is that it drove out 
chaotic and unregulated state currency, and that it helped create a market for United 
States bonds, which were necessary to finance the Civil War.160 
In terms of its effect on payment forms, the 10 percent tax effectively eliminated 
the state bank alternative to the national notes.  But it may not have been the most heavy-
handed means available to Congress.  In Veazie Bank v. Fenno,161 a Maine bank 
challenged the 10 percent tax.  Although the bulk of the Supreme Court’s opinion 
addressed arguments about whether the tax was direct (which would have required it to 
be laid in proportion to the Census), Veazie Bank also contended that the tax was 
unconstitutional because its purpose was to altogether prevent state banks from issuing 
notes .162 The Court disposed of this argument by stating that it was irrelevant whether 
the tax was an indirect attempt to outlaw state notes because Congress had the power to 
 
156 HARRY D. HUTCHINSON, MONEY, BANKING, AND THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY 61-62 (4th ed.) 
157 Id. at 62. 
158 HUTCHINSON, supra note 156, at 62. 
159 Id. By the mid-1870s, state banks had rebounded by replacing the income they lost from the issuance of 
notes with income from providing borrowers with newly-established checking accounts.  Id. at  63.  
160 FAULKER, supra,note 152, at 511. 
161 75 U.S. 533. 
162 Id. at 548. 
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directly prohibit the notes.163 As one constitutional scholar has described, on this point 
Veazie is “more than a little glib and was certainly generous in its interpretation of 
congressional power.”164 
But if, in fact, Congress had the authority to directly outlaw the notes and 
perceived itself as having this authority, the 10 percent tax emphasizes an important 
point: when we suggest that the government use hard shoves to ensure the success of a 
payment form, we do not mean that the government should use the hardest possible 
shove.  Instead, the government should do only what is necessary to make a particular 
payment system prevail.  There is usually good reason to use the lightest touch possible, 
either because the government may be concerned about exceeding its authority, or 
because it is often politically astute to appear to be doing something less than 
steamrolling over constituent preferences.   
This point may have particular relevance for the 10 percent tax.  At least one 
scholar has questioned the traditional account of Congressional motives and argued that 
the state banking system was considerably sounder than the traditional account admits.  
As George Selgin points out, if state bank notes were clearly inferior to national bank 
notes, then no tax should have been necessary to drive them out of existence; rather, 
consumers should have adopted national bank notes even in the absence of a prohibitive 
tax.165 Selgin posits that the tax drove out state bank notes “that were considered just as 
good for most purposes as their national counterparts.”166 If Selgin’s historical account is 
accurate, then the 10 percent tax did not simply cement a system that consumers were 
inclined to favor; rather, it forced consumers to use national bank notes instead of the 
state alternative. 
In any event, the combined effect of legal tender provision and the 10 percent tax 
was transformative.  Prior to the Civil War, the nation had two forms of currency: coin 
and state bank notes.  By the War’s end, the nation had three sources of currency: coin, 
 
163 Id. at 549. 
164 DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888 
319 (1985). As Currie explains, “The only explicit authority referred to was the power to coin money, and . 
. . there was considerable doubt whether that power even authorized the issuance of paper money, much 
less empowered Congress to forbid state bank notes.”  Id. 
165 George Selgin, The Suppression of State Banknotes: A Reconsideration, 38 Econ. Inquiry 600, 600 (Oct. 
2000). 
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demand notes, and national bank notes.  Indeed, it is not hyperbole to say that the 
monetary hard shoves of the Civil War period created the governmental role of fiduciary 
as described in this paper, which largely contemplates the government acting to protect or 
replace its paper money.167 People may have preferred hard money during the Civil War 
era, but that preference was effectively steamrolled.  When the government makes a 
strong shove for a particular payment system, the shove tends to stick, at least as long as 
the government itself sticks.  This is a point we return to after our discussion of the euro. 
To be fair, the European Union and the 12 member countries that launched the 
euro had worked hard to avoid the necessity of a shove.168 The euro was a long time 
coming.  As early as 1957, the Treaty of Rome declared that Europe would strive for a 
common European market.  The Single European Act (1986) and the Treaty of the 
European Union (1992) built on this objective by introducing the Economic and 
Monetary Union, which provided the foundation for a single currency.  In 1995, the 
European Council coined the name “euro.”169 In 1999, the exchange rate for each 
national currency was set and the euro was officially launched, but it operated without 
any tangible manifestation.  For three years, each country continued to use its own notes 
and coins, although European stock exchanges and banks were required to use euros for 
all non-cash transactions.170 Euros, for this period, were exclusively digital. 
Then came the hard shove.  On January 1, 2002, euro bank notes and coins began 
to circulate.  With the exception of Germany, each country allowed a brief interlude 
(typically two months) during which both euros and national currency were legal tender.  
But at the end of the dual circulation period, national notes and coins were no longer 
legal tender, although they could still be redeemed for euros.  Citizens in the 12 member 
countries could no longer avoid the euro, regardless of their preferences.     
These preferences were and are decidedly mixed and, in some countries, 
markedly negative.  The European Commission has monitored public opinion about the 
 
167 See Veazie, 75 U.S. at 549 (“Having . . . undertaken to provide a currency for the whole country, it 
cannot be questioned that Congress . . . may secure the benefit of it to the people by appropriate 
legislation.”) 
168 The 12 member countries are Greece, Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, and Finland.  Information available at 
http://www.euro.ecb.int./en/section1/timetable.GR.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2006). 
169 Pun absolutely intended. 
170 Information available at www.euro.efcb.int/en/what/history/html. 
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euro since March 2000.  Although the questions vary a bit from survey to survey, the 
Commission’s work provides a continuing snapshot of the euro’s reception.  The upshot 
of this polling data, excerpted below, is that significant numbers of citizens across the 12 
member countries would have preferred not to have the euro in the first instance,171 and 
that more than four years of life with the euro seems to have not dramatically affected 
attitudes toward it.  
 
* Just five weeks before the launch of euro banknotes and coins, 48% of people 
polled in the 12 member countries thought the euro “will mean more advantages 
than disadvantages [to them] personally,” while 40% expected more personal 
disadvantages.  In Germany, the country most hostile toward the euro, 41% 
expected more personal advantages, while 51% expected more disadvantages.172 
* One year after the launch of euro banknotes and coins, 50% of the people polled 
in the 12 member countries described themselves as happy that the euro had 
become their country’s currency; 39% as unhappy, and 11% as neither happy nor 
unhappy.  In Germany, 28% described themselves as happy; 68% as unhappy, and 
4% as neither happy nor unhappy.173 In a related measure, 54% of the people 
polled in the 12 member countries described themselves as believing the adoption 
of the euro was “advantageous overall” and would “strengthen their country for 
the future,” whereas 32% described the adoption as disadvantageous, and 7% 
perceived no change.  In Germany, 39% believed euro adoption was 
advantageous for their country overall; 52% believed adoption was 
disadvantageous, and 4% perceived no change.174 
* Two years after the launch, 47% of the people polled in the 12 member 
countries described themselves as happy that the euro had become their currency; 
44% described themselves as unhappy, and 9% were neither happy nor unhappy.  
In Germany, 30% described themselves as happy; 67% described themselves as 
unhappy, and 2% described themselves as neither happy nor unhappy.175 In 
another measure, 52% of the people polled in the 12 member countries described 
the adoption of the euro as advantageous overall for their country; 36% described 
it as disadvantageous overall, and 5% perceived no change.  In Germany, 42% 
believed adoption was advantageous; 52% believed it was disadvantageous, and 
2% perceived no change.176 
171 Of course, some countries, such as Ireland, have been enthusiastic about the euro since the beginning.   
172 Gallup Europe, Flash EB N 115 Attitudes on the Euro (15/11/2001 – 26/11/2001), at 50 (Jan. 2002). 
173 Gallup Europe, Flash EB N 139 The Euro, one year later, at  74 (Nov. 2002). 
174 Id. at 66. 
175 Gallup Europe, The Euro, two years later, at 54 (Dec. 2003). 
176 Id. at 47.  
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* Three years after the launch, 53% of the people polled in the 12 member 
countries described adoption of the euro as advantageous overall for their country; 
36% described it as disadvantageous, and 5% perceived no change.177 In 
Germany, 41% found adoption advantageous for their country; 50% found it 
disadvantageous, and 5% perceived no change.178 
* Four years after the launch, 51% of the people polled in the 12 member 
countries recognized adoption of the euro as advantageous for their country 
overall; 39% as disadvantageous, and 6% perceived no change.179 In Germany, 
47% perceived adoption as advantageous for their country; 48% perceived it to be 
disadvantageous, and 39% perceived no change.180 
Indeed, what is particularly striking is how post-euro preferences remain largely 
unchanged.  But while the story of the euro is still unfolding, no one expects that these 
preferences will create a backlash that will resurrect national currencies, even in countries 
like Germany. 
 This is not to say, of course, that the adoption of the euro has not had political 
consequences.  Former German chancellor Helmut Kohl, for instance, writes in his 
memoir that he forced the euro on the German people against their will and that they 
voted him out of office because of it.181 As other example, many commentators believe 
that the Netherlands recently voted to reject the European Constitution because of 
widespread dissatisfaction with the euro.   
This emphasizes another larger point: in contexts where the government action 
invokes condemnation, the backlash predicted by social norm theory is one potential 
restraint on governmental action.  No government wants to end up reinforcing the very 
action it sought to discourage or making the behavior it was trying to promote even less 
preferred.  But just because a government that legislates or makes policy decisions about 
payment systems does not have to worry about preference backlash, it nonetheless has to 
concern itself with political consequences.  This is the perfectly obvious observation that 
politicians are held accountable by their constituents.  As such, governments engaging in 
hard shoves have the heavy burden of demonstrating that the promoted payment system 
genuinely benefits either the country as a whole or significant numbers of its citizens, or 
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that the payment system is necessary to serve some larger purpose.  The architects of the 
legal tender provision, for example, may have perceived it as necessary to preserve the 
solvency of big commercial banks, which would in turn allow for the sale of government 
bonds, which would in turn finance the Civil War.182 The European governments that 
adopted the euro believed that a common currency would result in economic strength; in 
time, their citizens will learn whether these governments were right.   
To connect back to a discussion earlier in the paper, if the United States 
government really wants Americans to adopt a dollar coin, then it should proceed with 
the hard shove of withdrawing the competing paper note.  This would have two 
advantages.  First, this is the mechanism most likely to result in success.  Second, and just 
as important, this route has the benefit of clarity.  In replacing the dollar bill, the 
government will have the burden of demonstrating that the switch benefits the economy 
as a whole.183 
Part V. Government Action and the Future of American Payment Systems 
 
Payment methods are poised to continue the massive evolution that has occurred 
over the past twenty-five years.   For instance, payments vendors are increasingly 
pushing various smart card systems.  Building on the success of SpeedPass (the 
ExxonMobil system which allows drivers to purchase gas at the pump with the wave of a 
smart card), both Visa and Mastercard are involved in projects to allow for so-called 
“contactless” payments.  As we noted in the Introduction, cellular phones may also soon 
become “digital wallets” that can pay for purchases, check balances, pay bills, and 
transfer funds.184 Finally, at least one government has begun to discuss whether it should 
issue electronic money.185 
182 For an explanation of why the legal tender provision was advantageous for commercial banks, see Dam, 
xupra note 148, at 408-10. 
183 See Caskey & St. Laurent, supra note 83, at 506 (making same point). 
184 Eric Dash & Ken Belson, Ring Up My Bill, Please: Mobile Payment Via Cellphone, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
21, 2006, at C1 & C4. 
185 The government is that of Singapore.  See Leo van Hove, Making electronic money legal tender: pros & 
cons (unpublished manuscript, Oct. 5, 2005) (on file with authors) (manuscript at 13). 
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Advocates of these new systems are increasingly likely to attempt to involve 
government in promoting their new payment mechanisms.  As Part IV illustrated, the 
federal government has a number of tools at its disposal that can promote the adoption of 
a payment system.  Because vendors will have made large investments in these systems, 
they have powerful incentives to call upon the government to aid them.  In this final Part, 
we suggest that such government intervention is often unwise, for three reasons.  First, 
technology moves quickly and the government (usually) moves slowly  As such, by the 
time the government intervenes, the “new” payment method it seeks to support might 
already be on its way out.  Second, with a bit of time, new payment systems that are 
sufficiently advantageous to the consumer are likely to flourish and thus governmental 
intervention is ultimately unnecessary.  Third, such intervention may have the unintended 
consequence of undermining the incentive to invest in new payment technologies in the 
first instance.  The next Part discusses the first two possibilities in the contexts of Check 
21 and the evolution of electronic giros in two European countries.  We then illustrate the 
third possibility by describing in a little more detail where the payments industry is likely 
to go over the next decade (always a dangerous task) and what actions industry players 
may call upon Congress to take.  We then conclude with a few thoughts on electronic 
currency, which is perhaps the most radical emerging payment system.  
 
A. Check 21 
 
As we described in the Introduction, Check 21 was designed to facilitate the 
exchange of electronic checks between banks.  But, as a legal matter, no law was 
necessary to achieve this result.  Prior to the passage of Check 21, no statute said that 
banks had to present paper checks to other banks for collection.  Even in the wake of 
Check 21, the law is silent on the form of technology used to exchange checks.  All 
Check 21 provides is that banks can no longer require that the original check be returned 
to them; instead, they have to accept some sort of electronic substitute.    The legislation 
was aimed at remedying a variant on the classic network effects problem.  Banks would 
not invest in the technology to allow electronic truncation because an insufficiently large 
number of other banks had adopted the technology.  Presumably, given the billions of 
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dollars  that electronic truncation was expected to save the banking industry, the 
technology should have eventually caught on.  But there was one additional 
complication: consumers who like receiving back their original checks.186 While banks, 
left to themselves, might have quickly migrated to electronic truncation, some banks were 
concerned they would lose customers if they, but not their competitors, switched to 
electronic truncation.  The problem was thus that the entrenched preferences of some 
consumers gave banks little incentive to move to the new system, even though it 
promised large savings.  Furthermore, at least at the time that Check 21 passed, no 
intermediary had emerged to internalize the switching costs.     
 Into this quagmire came Congress.  In Check 21, the national legislature solved 
the problem of consumer preferences by applying what amounted to a hard shove.  No 
matter where a consumer banked, she could not be guaranteed the return of her original 
checks, because her bank could not insist upon the return of the original from other 
financial institutions.   In addition, through the use of the legend we discussed in the 
Introduction, Congress attempted to educate consumers about the legal status of  
electronic checks and their printouts.  But the key was the hard shove. 
 What is complicated about this story is that the hard shove does not appear either 
necessary or successful.  Even without Check 21, a significant percentage of check 
payments were likely to migrate to electronic payments as a result of accounts receivable 
check conversion (“ARC”).  In the ARC process, a creditor takes a check written by a 
consumer to pay a bill and uses that check as an authorization to initiate an electronic 
direct debit from the consumer’s account (in other words, a payment flowing in the 
opposite direction of a direct deposit).  Consumers are given some form of notice that the 
company will be engaging in the practice and the opportunity to opt-out, but very few 
do.187 In 2004, more than a billion checks were converted to ARC payments,188 and in 
 
186 One further complication was that in the two states in which Revised Articles 3 and 4 have not yet been 
adopted –New York and South Carolina—consumers retained a statutory right to receive their paper checks 
back.   
187 See NACHA website at http://www.nacha.org/news/news/pressreleases/2005/Pr042005/pr042005.htm
(last viewed Mar. 29, 2006). 
188 Id. 
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2005, the amount was over 1.6 billion.189 In addition, another 160 million checks were 
converted to electronic payments at the point of sale in what are known as POP 
transactions.  In these, the consumer presents a check to a merchant, who then uses the 
check to initiate a direct debit from the consumer’s checking account (using the bank 
routing number and the account number found on the bottom line of the check), and then 
returns the check to the consumer as a receipt.190 Given the explosive growth in such 
alternatives to check truncation, it is far from clear that Check 21 was necessary. 
 In fact, to date, the scant evidence suggests that Check 21 has been particularly 
unsuccessful.    For instance, in a Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City publication in 
April 2005, the authors conceded that widespread electronic clearing of checks had not 
yet occurred and that, under existing conditions, electronic truncation was more 
expensive than paper check processing.191 Another report by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago suggested that, nine months after passage, only 1% of the checks processed by 
the Federal Reserve Banks were substitute checks.192 Assuming this number is correct, 
only about 130 million checks were converted.  That number obviously pales in 
comparison to the number of ARC transactions.  To date, it seems that Congressional 
efforts to push electronic truncation have failed.  Alternative technologies have emerged 
that make electronic truncation far less important than banks had predicted.193 
189 See NACHA statistics releases, available at 
http://www.nacha.org/news/Stats/stats2005/2nd%20Quarter%202005.pdf (1st and 2nd Quarters); 
http://www.nacha.org/news/Stats/stats2005/4th%20Quarter%202005.pdf (3rd and 4th Quarters) 
190 MANN & WINN, supra note 32, at 559-60. 
191 Larry Taft & Nathan Halmrast, Early Experiences with Check 21, Payment Systems Research Briefing 
(April 2005), available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/PSR/Briefings/PSR-
BriefingApril05.pdf  
192 See Tara Rice, Implementing the Check 21 Act: Potential risks facing banks, 217 Chicago Fed Letter 
(Aug 2005) at 3.  Apparently, the few checks that are presently converted are of particularly high value, for 
they account for 10% of the total value of checks.  Id. This development is in itself somewhat 
disconcerting.  As the author notes, banks are probably converting larger value checks, rather than lower 
value checks, because the bank can obtain “the float earned off the earlier availability of funds.”  Id. 
Because the banks have no obligation to pass these savings on to customers, see id. at 4 n.5, Check 21 
simply presents banks with an opportunity to gain additional profits with no improvement in services for 
customers.  Congress did require, in Check 21, that the Federal Reserve investigate whether the funds 
availability laws and regulations (primarily the Expedited Funds Availability Act and Regulation CC) 
should be updated in light of Check 21, but to date there have been no changes.  Mark Budnitz, Consumer 
Payment Products and Systems: The Need for Uniformity and the Risk of Political Defeat, 24 Ann. Rev. 
Bank. & Fin. L. 247, 258 (2005) 
193 A recent Wall Street Journal article suggests that Check 21 is facilitating the use of ATM machines that 
can create a digital image of a check, thereby enabling the consumer to use a “no envelope” deposit.  There 
is no indication, however, that Congress foresaw this development, which underscores the point that the 
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In this particular case, the failure of the hard shove seems costless because there 
has been little political backlash, either in the aftermath of the legislation’s passage or in 
the face of its apparent ineffectiveness.  But the Check 21 saga illustrates that in applying 
hard shoves on behalf of industry, the government risks political backlash in situations 
where the results are uncertain.  When the European Union mandates the euro, or the 
Canadian government mandates the loon, they can be pretty sure that they will succeed.  
But when the government seeks to get involved in promoting private payment networks, 
the outcomes are far less certain, which should caution against government entanglement. 
 
B. Electronic Giros 
 
In our Check 21 example, substitute checks became less relevant in the wake of 
ARC technology.  Another possibility is that the technology the government seeks to 
promote will remain important, so much so that it will eventually take off on its own, 
without governmental intervention.  An example from Europe helps illustrates this point. 
Getting consumers and merchants to switch from paper-based transactions, such 
as checks or giros,194 to electronic payments over networks results in significant social 
economic benefits.195 As such, a switch to electronic payments is to a country’s 
economic advantage.  In addition, we can assume that most merchants prefer electronic 
payment systems because they receive their money more quickly.  But European 
countries vary widely in the extent to which electronic payments are made.  For instance, 
in the Netherlands, the vast majority of non-cash payments are made by electronic “credit 
 
government is usually ill-suited to predict how technologies will develop.  Robin Sidel & Ian McDonald, 
The Envelope-Free ATM; Banks are Testing Verstions to Read Checks, Count Cash; Twizzlers Wrapper is 
Rejected, WALL STREET JOUR., May 8, 2006, at B1. 
194 A giro is a transaction in which the consumer issues a directive to her bank to pay a particular creditor.  
It is frequently distinguished from a check as a “push” rather than a “pull” transaction: whereas a check 
requires the creditor to go to the consumer’s bank and request payment (i.e., pull funds from the 
consumer’s account), in a giro transaction, the money is sent to the creditor’s account as a result of the 
consumer directing her own bank to make the payment (i.e., the consumer has pushed funds from her 
account to that of the creditor).  A giro transaction bears a great deal of similarity to the direct deposit 
transactions through which many employees are now paid.  For a further explanation, see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giro (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). 
195 David Humphrey et al., Benefits from a changing payment technology in European banking, __ J. 
Banking & Fin. ___ (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 2) (suggesting possible savings of up to 1% of 
national GDP, and documenting averge savings of 0.38% of national GDP). 
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transfers” (essentially electronic giro payments).196 Such payments are rarer in Greece197 
and Portugal.198 Instead, Greeks have continued to use checks and paper-based giros for 
the vast bulk of payments, and have adopted credit cards in large numbers for small-value 
transactions.  In Portugal, the data suggests that checks, but not paper-based giros, 
compete with electronic giros for payments.  These national differences are no doubt the 
result of both historical patterns of making payments as well as the price structure of 
various payment forms.   
With regard to the price structure of payments, the story is one with which a 
reader should be very familiar: banks expect that consumers will respond to price 
incentives; that is, banks anticipate that consumers will use electronic alternatives if they 
are cheaper than the paper equivalent.  But consumers rarely pay directly for such 
services; instead they pay indirectly, through the loss of the “float” on paper checks or 
through lower interest on account balances.  No bank wants to be the first (and possibly 
only) institution to start directly charging customers for services they had perceived as 
free.199 Again, the issue is a variant of the classic network effects problem.  So how can 
one country make the switch more quickly than the other? 
Between 1990 and 2004, Norway and the Netherlands experienced significant 
changes in the way that consumers paid for point-of-sale transactions.200 Electronic 
payments, however, took off more quickly in Norway than in the Netherlands.  This is 
because, in Norway, customers were charged a per-transaction fee for their use of both 
electronic and paper payment systems, with the electronic generally cheaper.201 
Norwegian banks were able to overcome the risk of losing customers by coordinating the 
timing of when per-transaction fees would begin.202 While ordinarily, this sort of 
collusion would draw the attention of antitrust officials,203 they did nothing to prevent it.  
Per-transaction fees were also encouraged by Norway’s central bank.  Not surprisingly, 
 
196 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, BLUE BOOK: PAYMENT AND SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND IN THE ACCEDING COUNTRIES 245-46 (2006) (26% of payments and 86% value of 
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200 Id.at 3 
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203 The banks did not coordinate the amount of per-transaction fees, which could be zero. 
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Norwegian consumers reacted to the price incentive by moving away from the old system 
to the new. 
But while change did not happen quite as rapidly in the Netherlands as in 
Norway, it still occurred.  In other words, even without a price incentive and the 
coordination that made the incentive possible, Dutch consumers eventually adopted the 
new payment systems.  For instance, per person use of electronic giro payments in 
Norway grew 12% annually between 1990 and 2004; per person use of electronic giro 
payments grew 7% annually in the Netherlands during the same time period.204 But in 
both countries, paper checks had almost entirely disappeared by 2004.  Dutch and 
Norwegian consumers had replaced them with electronic giros payments, debit cards, and 
cash that was usually withdrawn through an ATM.205 
A comparison of Norway and the Netherlands, then, suggests that sometimes the 
payment technology the government seeks to promote would have taken off without any 
legislative push, particularly if the technology is sufficiently advantageous to consumers 
and merchants.  In these situations, the government bears the risk of political backlash, all 
for legislation that offers no genuine long-term benefit.  And even in the absence of 
political backlash, legislating is costly.  If the legislation prompts no change beyond what 
the market would have accomplished in its own time, then legislative resources are better 
spent elsewhere.  Again, this cautions against government entanglement in private 
payment systems. 
 
C. The Future of Payment Systems 
 
Although predicting what is on the horizon of payment systems is a tricky 
endeavor, we are confident about what payment providers would like to see:  an increase 
in the use of smart card transactions, which may also lead to more use of stored value 
card networks.  Of course, to date, the American market has remained resistant and 
perhaps even hostile to both technologies.  We have already noted the spectacular failure 
of the Upper West Side experiment with stored value cards in the late 1990s.206 Most 
 
204 Id. at 5 
205 Id. at 3-4. 
206 See supra text accompanying note 12. 
61
other trials in the United States have failed as well, even though smart cards and stored 
value cards have been successful in other parts of the world.207 Analysts have attributed 
this to the United States’ advanced telecommunications system, which ensures that debit 
and credit card transactions can be verified quickly and cheaply.208 This infrastructure 
results in “relatively low fraud levels and relatively high levels of satisfaction among 
businesses and consumers within the current system.”209 As we have previously 
suggested, in order for an alternative payment option to succeed, some subset of 
transactions must exist in which the consumer will be better off if she uses the alternative 
option.  For the most part, only United States consumers who are essentially required to 
use a smart or stored value cards (such as those consumers in transportation systems or 
on military bases,) have found these payment options beneficial.210 
At present, it is difficult for us to see what benefits smart card technology will 
offer American consumers in retail transactions, at least in the near future.  At present, 
speed appears to be the primary advantage of the technology: it does not require the entry 
of a pin number or a signature. For example, ExxonMobil’s Speedpass allows drivers to 
purchase gasoline by waving the wand of the Speedpass in front of a reader.  Chase 
Bank’s Mastercard system similarly enables consumers to make small payments with a 
wave of a card.  More radically, cell phone manufacturers have begun to experiment with 
similar service through their phones, a system that has already taken hold in some parts of 
Asia.  But it is unclear whether speed is enough of an advantage to attract a critical mass 
of consumers.  In addition, because of the recent trend among some merchants to forego a 
signature for small credit or debit transactions,211 speed is suddenly not unique to smart 
card technology.  
Of course, some recent developments may benefit smart and stored value cards.  
First, some consumers are becoming more familiar with these payment options, either 
because they utilize transportation systems in major cities, or because they have been 
 
207 See Carol L. Clark, Shopping without cash: The emergence of the e-purse, Economic Perspectives, at 
34, 34 (4th Quarter 2005).  For instance, in Hong Kong, nearly 95% of residents carry the Octupus card, 
which is a stored value card that uses RFID smart card technology. 
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210 Id. at 37-42 (examining six case studies and noting the success of military smart cards). 
211See Deb Gruver, Signatures Not Required for Small Purchases at Many Wichita, Kan. Retailers, KNIGHT 
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involved with a university that sponsors a smart or stored value card,212 or because they 
have seen advertising by companies like Chase and ExxonMobil.   In addition, increasing 
numbers of merchants are unwilling to accept checks for retail transactions.213 The 
decline of the check may leave room for a new payment system, perhaps one that will 
appeal to consumers who have previously eschewed credit and debit cards.  It is not clear 
to us, however, that smart or stored value cards can capitalize on this market niche.   
At the same time, however, as payment providers invest resources in smart and 
stored value card options, there will be tremendous pressure for them to succeed.   
 Of course, the key to any new smart card or stored value card technology will be 
ensuring sufficient use by both consumers and merchants.  How precisely coordination of 
the demand by both sides can be achieved is not clear – if we knew, we would not be 
writing law review articles!  But what does seem certain is that the competitive pressure 
to use these technologies, particularly smart card technology, is only likely to increase in 
coming years.214 Against this background, it would be surprising if industry did not 
attempt to enlist government support for its new technologies.  As we have explained, our 
view is that, in general, the federal government should resist such entreaties.   
Industries’ most likely request is that government require operators of new 
payment systems to increase interoperability.  For example, consider the market for 
payments by cell phone.  Interoperability issues could arise at two different levels.  First, 
different cell phone companies may develop different technologies, with the result that 
only some cell phones will work in one location to make a payment, while other cell 
phones will work in another location.  Second, cell phone companies may differ in what 
 
212See id. at 39-41.  Of course, just because they have been exposed to such systems does not mean that the 
systems have always flourished.  Clark compares the failure of the University of Michigan system with the 
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payment services they are willing to offer to customers.  One company might allow its 
customers to select among accounts from which to make payments, while another 
company may require that customers only make payments through a credit card, perhaps 
even a particular bank’s credit card.   
Just as the Federal Reserve and banking interests sought congressional aid in 
mandating the acceptance of substitute checks, payments industry parties may seek 
assistance in gaining acceptance of a particular cell phone technology.  In Hong Kong, 
for instance, nearly 95 percent carry the Octopus card, which is a stored value card that 
(like E-ZPass) uses RFID technology.215 One of the main factors in the Octopus card’s 
phenomenal success was the formation of a joint venture by the five largest public 
transportation providers to support the creation of a card that would work on all of their 
lines.216 Similarly, the success of smart cards in Europe has been tied to the willingness 
of state telephone companies to mandate their adoption for pay phones.217 For cell phone 
payment schemes to work in the United States, interoperability is also likely to be crucial; 
only interoperability will allow sufficient benefits to satisfy the heterogeneous 
preferences of a critical mass of consumers, which will in turn induce merchants to 
accept cell phone payments.  
One quick means of increasing the possibility of a critical mass is for the 
government to mandate a particular technology.218 Such a move would, of course, limit 
consumer choice among possible products.  For instance, Cingular is testing a product in 
Atlanta that uses special RFID chips in cell phone handset covers to allow customers to 
make payments at Philips Arena.219 In this product, the chip connects the cell phone with 
the customer’s “exiting Chase credit card accounts.”220 An alternative product is 
Obopay, which provides consumers with software that allows them to receive and make 
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various payments via their phone.221 In the Obopay system, the phone itself is not used to 
make retail payments; instead, the consumer uses a special debit card that is linked to the 
Obopay account.222 One possibility is that smaller existing payment providers will 
pressure the government to ensure that these new services provide access to not just 
particular accounts, but to all of a consumer’s credit and/or deposit accounts.223 On its 
face, such governmental intervention is appealing, for it would make such products 
attractive to a wider variety of consumers and thereby increase the likelihood of adoption.   
The rub is that the success of such systems is likely to require not just attractive services, 
but also the use of incentives.224 For example, Obopay presently gives new users $10 in 
their account just for signing up.  Incentives are costs, and those costs need to be 
internalized by someone.  The most likely parties are existing payment providers.  And if 
those providers are not guaranteed exclusive access to customers, they may fail to invest 
in the first place.  In this context, then, government interference, far from increasing 
consumer choice, may actually undermine it. 
 Stored value cards present a similar problem.  Notwithstanding the success of 
Octopus in Hong Kong, stored value cards have usually failed in the United States,225 and 
have had mixed results in Europe.226 Nonetheless, moving from cash transactions to 
electronic transactions promises significant savings for the United States economy,227 so 
the interest in pushing this technology will remain.228 One intriguing possibility, which is 
currently under discussion in Singapore, is for the federal government itself to actually 
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issue electronic money.229 A more radical possibility would be for the government to 
make electronic currency (rather than coins and notes) legal tender or to even abolish 
coins and notes altogether.230 Any of these actions would necessitate the use of stored 
value cards; the stored value card would provide a means for the consumer to present her 
money to the merchant during point-of-sale transactions. 
 We will start with the most extreme option – replacing coins and notes with 
electronic currency.  In this scenario, the government would be mandating the switch to a 
cashless society.  Assuming such a decision was constitutional,231 this hard shove would 
no doubt succeed, but would also be unwise.  As we saw with the euro, overriding some 
consumers’ preferences for preexisting cash systems can create short-term (and perhaps 
long-term) political backlashes that frustrate other governmental objectives (and thus 
provide a cost that may outweigh the benefits of change).  A mandatory switch to a 
cashless society in the United States would likely be accompanied by even greater 
negative political consequences, particularly in light of the threat to privacy and the 
possibility that some consumers who could not master electronic currency technology  
might be pushed into the underground economy.232 As a result, such a move is not only 
unwise, it is unlikely to even occur in the foreseeable future. 
 A slightly less radical option, however, is for the government to make electronic 
currency legal tender.  That is, the government could simply mandate that electronic 
currency, like coins and notes, has to be accepted for all debts.  This would also amount 
to a hard shove, although not nearly as hard as altogether abolishing coins and notes.  But 
so long as it was clear that merchants need not accept electronic currency in point-of-sale 
transactions, the shove might well fail.  As the examples of the dollar coins and two-
dollar bill illustrated, just because a payment form is legal tender does not mean that a 
critical mass of consumers will start to use it.  In the absence of demonstrably greater 
benefits for both consumers and merchants, many people may simply choose not to adopt 
electronic currency and the stored values cards that would accompany it.  
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An even gentler approach would be for the government to indicate that it would 
accept electronic currency for all debts (most prominently, of course, for tax payments).  
This would amount to an incentive for consumers to use the system.  As with a legal 
tender statute, however, the problem with both this possibility (and the even gentler one, 
that is, that the government simply issue electronic money) is that it is by no means clear 
that the governmental intervention would work.  Certainly, government willingness to 
issue electronic currency payments and to receive them would give both consumers and 
merchants a further incentive to adopt stored value card systems.  But as we have noted, 
the adoption and use decisions are separate.  It is far from clear that in either case, the 
government actions would be enough to get consumers to use electronic currency on a 
day-to-day basis, particularly if it remains relatively easy to convert electronic currency 
into coins or notes.233 
Moreover, the stronger the governmental shove towards stored value cards, the 
greater the risk that the government will stifle competition in the electronic payments 
industry.  Because stored value cards are currently not a necessity, there is competitive 
pressure for payment providers to entice consumers and merchants with special 
incentives and services.  Payment providers also have an incentive to continue to develop 
new technologies that expand the appeal of their products.  Any governmental action that 
forces stored value cards upon consumers and merchants is likely to cut off these sorts of 
innovations and incentives because they will no longer be necessary to ensure widespread 
use of stored value cards.  The potential for stifling competition in the payments industry, 
then, is another reason why government should rarely intervene in the private payments 
industry. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Close your wallets.  As we have discussed, whatever payment options you found 
inside it are the result of both platform economics and incremental changes in payment 
 
233 Say, for example, the federal government begins issuing tax refunds in “digital dollars” and that such 
digital dollars are fully convertible to dollar bills.  Given the current technology in place, consumers would 
have no particular reason not to continue to withdraw the digital dollars from their accounts in the form of 
cash, rather than as stored value.  It is only when the digital dollars cannot be converted, for example, when 
coins and notes are abolished, that consumers have an incentive to use the stored value card. 
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technologies over the course of the last 50 years.  The government has the ability to 
influence these platform economics, either with gentle measures or with strong ones.   
But although the government does not have to worry that its attempts to influence 
consumer and merchant preferences will end up reinforcing the very payment options it is 
seeking to replace, it nonetheless must exercise caution.  Not only do politicians have to 
worry about political backlash, but such intervention may have consequences that the 
government cannot foresee.  By the time the government acts, the “new” payment 
method it seeks to support might already be on its way towards obsolescence, the 
payment alternative may be capable of flourishing without governmental intervention, or 
the intervention might stifle competition in the payments industry.  Nonetheless, as 
payment providers strive to put their products in your wallet, they are likely to ask the 
government for help when they believe it is necessary.   
One thing is certain.  When our children open their wallets 50 years from now, 
they are likely to find payment alternatives that are very different from the ones we use 
today.  But the explanation for why our children use these payment methods is likely to 
be the same as the one offered in this paper.  No payment alternative will succeed unless 
it can attract adequate users on both sides of the platform.  What will be interesting is 
which emergent payment systems follow the upwards trajectory of credit and debit cards, 
and which go the way of the two-dollar bill. 
 
______ 
 
